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EDITORIAL
Although growth in the euro area was in line 
with our expectations in the first quarter, 
activity turned out to be disappointingly 
slow in the second quarter. Surging oil 
prices and the loss in momentum of the 
global manufacturing boom have both taken 
their toll on business and consumer 
confidence in the euro area.  
While the Commission’s spring forecast for 
1.6% growth in the euro area this year may 
ultimately prove to be a little optimistic, 
there are a number of reasons to be 
confident that we will see a pick-up in 
growth towards the second half of the year. 
There are early signs that the soft patch in 
the global economy is coming to an end and 
that world trade is growing again. The 
recent fall in the external value of the euro 
will, of course, also work in favour of our 
exporters. Monetary and financial 
conditions remain supportive of growth and 
are now being accompanied by signs of 
increasing confidence in survey data. All in 
all, growth is likely to gradually return to 
potential during the course of the year.  
When we look at the individual Member 
States of the euro area, there are of course 
differences in their economic performance. 
In recent months, increased differences in 
quarterly growth rates and the composition 
of growth (particularly between the four 
largest euro area Member States – Germany, 
France, Italy and Spain) have attracted 
considerable attention. This topic and the 
related policy challenges have been debated 
extensively since the creation of the euro. 
This report therefore devotes a special focus 
section to the character and causes of 
growth differences in the euro area and their 
consequences for economic policy under 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). 
The related issue of Member States’ housing 
markets and their link with economic 
performance is examined separately.  
Concerning growth differences, we should 
be aware that quarterly data tend to be quite 
volatile and may therefore overstate the true 
size of growth differences. In fact, annual 
total growth differences in the euro area in 
the past few years have not been higher than 
in previous cycles, and they are of the same 
order of magnitude as differences across US 
states and German Länder.  
Growth differences are a natural and 
inevitable feature of any large monetary 
union. They may reflect different 
demographic developments or differences 
in economic structures. They may even be 
desirable if they reflect an increase in the per 
capita income levels of catching-up 
countries. In addition, growth differences 
may simply result from dissimilar business 
cycles, which may be exacerbated by 
inadequate macroeconomic policies. On this 
front much progress has been made. 
Member States’ business cycles have 
become more closely aligned over the last 
few years, thanks to the positive impact of 
economic integration and better overall 
macroeconomic management across 
countries. This is good news for EMU, as 
monetary unions work best when their 
members enjoy a high degree of cyclical 
synchronicity.  
I see little cause for complacency, however, 
as growth differences have persisted over 
time and become entrenched. Indeed, a 
remarkable persistence can be observed in 
the relative growth performance across 
countries. Those Member States that grew 
rapidly or slowly in the nineties are the same 
ones that grew rapidly or slowly in recent 
years. This does not seem to be attributable 
to faster growth among catching-up 
economies. Overall, although total growth 
differences across euro area Member States 
are not high in comparison with previous 
cycles, the dispersion of potential output 
growth is at a historically high level.  
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area II/2005 
 
 
 
- 4 - 
Turning to the possible sources of growth 
differences, our analysis reveals a variety of 
temporary and longer-term factors. Firstly, 
common disturbances such as fluctuations 
in the oil price or the exchange rate of the 
euro have affected Member States in 
different ways, due to differences in their 
economic structures, their degree of 
economic openness and their geographical 
and sectoral specialisation. Secondly, the 
launch of EMU may itself have had a 
temporarily differentiated impact. Indeed, 
the exchange rates fixed for some Member 
States appear – in retrospect – not to have 
been fully in line with fundamentals. 
Furthermore, the falling risk premium on 
real interest rates as a result of the 
Maastricht convergence process spurred 
domestic demand in a number of Member 
States. Thirdly, lax budgetary policies in 
some Member States during the good times 
of the late nineties hindered the free play of 
automatic stabilisers during the recent 
downturn. Fourthly, differences in the 
transmission of monetary and fiscal policy 
could contribute to the observed cyclical 
differences. Finally, from a longer term 
perspective, divergences across Member 
States in the relative contributions of labour, 
capital and productivity developments to 
growth have played a role.  
In some respects, the real issue here is not 
that differences have appeared across 
countries, but the fact that they have been 
absorbed only slowly. The response of 
relative prices and wages to economic 
shocks – the so-called competitiveness 
channel – has been very gradual in the euro 
area, leading to drawn-out cycles of 
overheating and overcooling. 
I believe that getting to grips with growth 
differences in the euro area is a matter of 
priority for economic policies. A failure to 
act now will have costly repercussions later, 
as a Member State that does not absorb a 
shock rapidly, may endure a protracted 
period of low growth. This is unwelcome as 
it could trigger a damaging spiral of falling 
potential growth due to weak investment, 
eroding skills and rising levels of economic 
inactivity amongst the working age 
population. An extended period of below-
potential growth will also weigh heavily on 
consumer and investor expectations and 
may also create severe budgetary difficulties. 
A number of practical steps could be taken 
to tackle growth differences in the euro 
area. On the macroeconomic side, it is 
essential that automatic budgetary stabilisers 
are able to function fully in the face of 
certain types of economic disturbance. 
Implementing the reformed Stability and 
Growth Pact with rigour and credibility will 
create room for manoeuvre for fiscal policy 
to play its role in smoothing growth 
differences. On the microeconomic side, a 
further effective integration of product, 
labour and capital markets would help EMU 
to function more smoothly by encouraging a 
closer alignment of national business cycles. 
Finally, action is needed in order to boost 
the competitiveness channel and the 
responsiveness of prices and wages through 
policies to raise productivity and foster 
competition in product markets, and by 
reconsidering the process of wage 
determination. 
In short, and as expected, EMU entails a 
fundamental shift in the economic policy 
framework. In the absence of national 
interest and exchange rates, it is paramount 
that national economic policies increase 
resilience in the face of economic shocks 
and promote adjustment to long-term 
trends. The persistence of growth 
differences in the euro area suggests that 
some Member States need to boost their 
adjustment mechanisms via accelerated 
economic reform, deeper trade and financial 
integration, and sounder budgetary 
situations. Member States that have 
followed this advice have learned not only 
to live with, but also to prosper under, 
EMU. Other Member States, until they 
follow suit, will continue to pay a high self-
imposed price for their lack of reform. 
 
Joaquín ALMUNIA 
MEMBER OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION
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I. Economic situation in the euro area 
Economic growth in the euro area was disappointing during the first half of the year. A global deceleration in the 
manufacturing sector and surging oil prices took their toll on business and consumer confidence and activity. GDP growth 
rebounded in the first quarter as projected in the Commission’s spring forecasts. However, contrary to expectations, the pick-
up was entirely attributable to net trade with domestic demand showing broad-based weakness. Furthermore, available survey 
data suggest that activity slowed again in the second quarter. For 2005 as a whole, the growth projections presented in the 
Commission’s spring 2005 forecasts now appear to be somewhat on the high side. Nevertheless, there are early signs that the 
soft patch in the global economy may be coming to an end and that world trade picked up again in the second quarter. 
Monetary and financial conditions remain quite supportive and the recent weakening of the external value of the euro should 
provide further support to euro-area exports. Conditions seem therefore to be in place for a recovery of activity in the euro area 
with growth gradually returning to potential during the remainder of the year. Both hard data and surveys have come in better 
than expected in recent weeks, supporting this scenario. As to inflation, recent developments in oil prices and the euro pose an 
upside risk to the short-term outlook but labour cost pressures and inflation expectations remain so far contained.
1. Recent economic developments and 
short-term prospects1  
Robust but uneven growth in the first quarter 
As projected in the Commission’s spring 2005 
economic forecasts, euro-area GDP grew by 
0.5% q-o-q in the first quarter of 2005. This was 
the fastest quarterly rate since the first quarter of 
2004. The composition of growth was, however, 
less encouraging as regards the sustainability of 
the internal upswing, since growth was driven 
entirely by net trade, and domestic demand did 
                                                     
1 The cut-off date for the statistics included in this issue 
was 12 July 2005.  
not grow at all. In addition, the growth rebound 
can be partly attributed to the fact that working 
day corrections may have exaggerated the extent 
of the deterioration of activity in Germany in the 
last quarter of 2004.  
The change in net trade was due to a sharp fall in 
imports of goods and services in line with the 
stagnation of final demand, while exports 
continued to grow, albeit at a slower rate. The 
vigour of net trade might be considered 
surprising in view of expectations from 
economic theory that the strength of the euro 
Table 1: Euro-area growth components 
Forecast (1) 
 2004 Q2 
2004 
Q3 
2004 
Q4 
2005 
Q1 
Carryover 
to 2005 2005 (2) 2006 (2) 
 % change on previous period, volumes 
GDP 0.4  0.3  0.2  0.5  0.9 1.6   2.1   
Private consumption 0.1  0.3  0.6  0.3  0.9 1.6   1.8   
Government consumption 0.7  0.9  0.2  -0.2  0.6 1.4   2.0   
Gross fixed capital formation 0.4  0.5  0.8  -0.7  0.2 2.8   3.7   
Changes in inventories (% of GDP) -0.2  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0 1.1   0.9   
Exports of goods and services 2.7  1.0  0.3  0.2  1.6 5.4   5.9   
Imports of goods and services 2.7  2.4  0.9  -1.1  1.3 6.0   6.4   
 % contribution to change in GDP 
Private consumption 0.0  0.2  0.4  0.2  0.5   0.9   1.0   
Government consumption 0.1  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.1   0.3   0.4   
Gross fixed capital formation 0.1  0.1  0.2  -0.1  0.0   0.6   0.8   
Changes in inventories 0.1  0.3  -0.2  0.0  0.0   0.0   0.0   
Net exports 0.1  -0.5  -0.2  0.5  0.1   -0.1   -0.1   
(1) Annual change in %.         (2) European Commission Spring 2005 Forecasts. 
Source: Commission services. 
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should be reflected in an adverse effect on extra-
euro-area trade flows. However, the fact that the 
growth rate of exports remained positive, in spite 
of world trade shrinking in the first quarter, 
would suggest that the negative effects of the 
past appreciation of the euro have largely petered 
out.  
Graph 1: Imports and final demand, euro area 
(y-o-y change in % – 1999Q1 to 2005Q1) 
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Source: Commission services. 
The weakness in domestic demand in the first 
quarter was broad-based: private consumption 
growth was halved compared to the previous 
quarter, while government consumption, 
inventories and investment all decreased in the 
first quarter. 
The below-average pace of private consumption 
growth paralleled a slight deterioration of 
consumer confidence during the first quarter. 
Surveys reveal that consumers became more 
pessimistic about employment prospects once 
again, against a background of a high but 
relatively stable unemployment rate. First-quarter 
surveys also revealed perceptions on the part of 
consumers of slightly stronger price trends. Such 
perceptions may have been influenced by the fact 
that euro–dollar exchange rate movements 
provided less shelter against rising oil prices in 
US dollars in the first quarter of the year. 
However, these results appear to be at odds with 
the actual evolution of annual HICP inflation in 
the first quarter, which was considerably lower 
than the fourth-quarter average due to favourable 
base effects. The apparent discrepancy between 
perceived and measured inflation may stem from 
the fact that respondents to the consumer survey 
probably assign excessive weight to the most 
recent price developments. 
The strong decline in gross fixed capital 
formation needs to be qualified. A detailed 
breakdown of first-quarter gross fixed capital 
formation by branch is not yet available for the 
euro area. However, estimates produced by the 
Commission services estimates based on national 
data releases reveal the key negative role played 
by the German and Italian construction sector. 
Euro-area construction investment is likely to 
have diminished as bad weather contributed to a 
further weakening of construction investment in 
Germany and weak sentiment depressed 
construction in Italy – notwithstanding 
substantial growth in Spain in France.  
Table 2: Selected euro-area and national leading indicators, 2004-2005 
 SENT. IND1) BCI2) OECD3) PMI Man.4) PMI Ser 5) IFO6) NBB7) ZEW8)
Long-term average 100.9 0.00 2.79 52.1 54.2 95.6   -9.5 34.5 
Trough in latest 
downturn 88.1 -1.25 -0.76 42.9 46.7 87.3 -26.5 -10.4 
July 2004 100.0   0.57 3.03 54.7 55.3 97.1 4.1   48.4   
August 2004 100.9   0.49 2.54 53.9 54.5 95.9 -2.1   45.3   
September 2004 100.9   0.51 2.28 53.1 53.3 95.7 -1.1   38.4   
October 2004 101.5   0.54 1.98 52.4 53.5 95.9 -0.5   31.3   
November 2004 100.9   0.39 1.85 50.4 52.6 94.3 -6.6   13.9   
December 2004 100.2   0.44 1.44 51.4 52.7 96.4 -5.3   14.4   
January 2005 100.8   0.40 1.15 51.9 53.4 97.5 -5.0   26.9   
February 2005 98.8   0.21 0.78 51.9 53.0 96.3 -11.4   35.9   
March 2005 97.5   -0.09 0.20 50.4 53.0 94.6 -9.4   36.3   
April 2005 96.5   -0.28 -0.45 49.2 52.8 93.6 -15.9   20.1   
May 2005 96.1   -0.37 -0.87 48.7 53.5 92.3 -16.1   13.9   
June 2005 96.3 -0.40 49.9 53.1 92.9 -14.4   19.5   
1) Economic sentiment indicator, DG ECFIN. 2) Business climate indicator, DG ECFIN. 3) Composite leading indicator, six monthly 
change. 4) Reuters Purchasing Managers Index, manufacturing. 5)  Reuters Purchasing Manager Index, services. 6) Business expectations, 
West Germany. 7)  National Bank of Belgium indicator for manufacturing. 8) Business expectations of financial market analysts, Germany. 
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Euro-area investment in equipment, on the other 
hand, probably rose for a fourth consecutive 
quarter. The recovery in equipment investment 
over the last four quarters was modest, at an 
average pace of 0.9% q-o-q. Notwithstanding 
favourable financing conditions and the 
improved corporate balance-sheet situation, the 
strength of the recovery is still being held back 
by the stagnation of final demand and, possibly, 
by more long-term factors related to the 
slowdown of the growth in total factor 
productivity in the euro area.2 While Germany, 
Spain and France all contributed positively to 
euro-area growth in investment in equipment, it 
went down in Italy. 
Finally, growth was also uneven from a Member 
State perspective, with growth in the first-quarter 
ranging from 2.4% q-o-q in Greece, 1.0% in 
Germany, 0.9% in Spain to 0 or less in Belgium, 
the Netherlands and Finland, and a technical 
recession in Italy (see also the Focus section on 
“Growth differences in the euro area” in this 
issue). In the case of Germany, however, there 
are indications that first-quarter growth was 
artificially strong and fourth-quarter growth 
artificially weak as a result of statistical effects 
linked to the correction for the number of 
working days. 
The euro area did not escape the global 
deceleration in the industrial sector 
In the first quarter, the gross value added of the 
industrial sector increased faster than total gross 
value added (0.7% q-o-q against 0.4%). However, 
the increase in industry followed a decline of 
similar magnitude in the previous quarter, 
suggesting that it might only be linked to 
working-day adjustments. The industrial sector 
has been affected by the worldwide soft patch 
which has led to an outright contraction in world 
trade during the first quarter. Developments in 
euro-area manufacturing confidence indicators 
suggest that the bout of manufacturing weakness 
persisted during most of the second quarter.  
In the midst of the industrial slowdown, the 
services sector is sustaining GDP growth. The 
                                                     
2  See ‘Structural factors weighing on the investment 
recovery’, Quarterly Report on the Euro Area, Volume 4 
No. 1 (2005). 
industrial sector’s share in the gross value added 
of the euro-area economy (21% in 2004) is 
dwarfed by the services sector (71%).3 Value 
added in market services grew twice as fast as 
industry over the last four quarters (2.1% y-o-y 
against 1.0% y-o-y). Compared to the industrial 
sector, the service sector is less sensitive to 
developments in the international environment. 
As a result, the short-term outlook for the 
services sector remains healthy. The services 
confidence indicator and the forward-looking 
elements of the survey (demand and 
employment) have eased somewhat, compared to 
summer 2004. Nevertheless, in contrast to the 
industry survey results, the services indicators 
remain well above the levels recorded in the first 
half of 2003, before the recovery set in. 
The recovery is under pressure from rising 
oil prices… 
After retreating somewhat in April and May, oil 
prices have resumed their upward trend, with 
Brent approaching USD 60 per barrel in the 
beginning of July 2005. This compares to the 
assumptions of USD 51 per barrel for 2005 and 
USD 48 for 2006 made in the Commission’s 
spring 2005 forecasts. Futures prices imply 
higher prices for delivery in coming months, 
peaking around February 2006, and declining 
very gradually afterwards. This profile 
corresponds to an average price of USD 54 per 
barrel in 2005 and USD 59 per barrel in 2006 
(respectively 6% and 23% higher than assumed 
in the spring forecast).  
The recent surge in oil prices seems to find its 
origin in renewed concerns about demand rising 
more rapidly than supply, contributing to an even 
tighter market. The limited spare production 
capacity has left the oil market vulnerable to 
shocks, which could drive prices even higher.  
If it is maintained, the recent sharp rise in oil 
prices will somewhat dampen growth prospects 
in 2005 and 2006. However, the Commission’s 
spring 2005 forecasts were already based on the 
                                                     
3  The shares of construction and agriculture are 
respectively 6% and 2% of the total. The service sector 
can be further broken down into a market and non-
market component accounting, respectively, for 49% and 
22% of GDP.  
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assumption of rising oil prices and the additional 
brake on growth from recent developments in oil 
markets should not be overstated. Simulations 
suggest that a permanent 15% increase in oil 
prices (which broadly corresponds to the average 
difference in 2005-2006 between the oil price 
forecast provided by futures markets and the 
baseline in the spring forecast), would lower 
euro-area GDP growth by around 0.2 pp in 2005 
and 0.1 pp in 2006. Euro-area inflation would be 
only marginally higher (0.1 pp in 2005 – no effect 
in 2006).4 
Graph 2: Oil price assumptions in the Spring Forecasts 
and futures prices (US$/barrel – 2005Q1 to 2006Q4)  
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Source: Commission services.  
Any additional inflationary pressure from higher 
oil prices would, however, reduce the room for 
manoeuvre of monetary policy and would retard 
the growth of real disposable income. Survey 
results suggest that the rise in oil prices may 
already be affecting consumers’ perceptions of 
their disposable income since their price 
expectations have increased somewhat in the past 
months. Moreover, consumers’ growth 
expectations have deteriorated to their lowest 
level since autumn 2003. As a result, consumer 
confidence dropped somewhat in May and June, 
suggesting a weaker outlook for private 
consumption. This marked the end of a six-
month period during which consumer 
confidence stayed fairly stable, while the business 
climate indicator declined continuously. 
                                                     
4  Results from simulations with DG ECFIN’s Quest 
model. These calculations take into account the 
repercussions stemming from global trade, with lower 
demand from oil-importing countries counterbalanced 
somewhat by higher demand from the oil-exporting 
countries, which benefit from the higher price of oil. 
…but the weaker euro and a stronger world 
economy should support the recovery during 
the second half of 2005  
After reaching a high of USD 1.36 at the end of 
2004, the euro exchange rate depreciated, to a 
monthly average of about USD 1.22 in June 
2005. If the bilateral exchange rate were to 
remain stable at this level during the rest of 2005 
and 2006, the annual averages for 2005 and 2006 
would be, respectively, 4% and 8% below the 
spring forecast assumptions.  
Graph 3: Confidence indicators, euro area 
(monthly data – Sep 2003 to Jun 2005) 
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
Sep-03 Jan-04 May-04 Sep-04 Jan-05 May-05
Business climate indicator (1)
Service confidence indicator (1)
Consumer confidence
 
(1) Normalised. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
The effect of the euro depreciation on euro-area 
growth and inflation depends on the source of 
the shock to the exchange rate. Under the 
assumption that the rise in the value of the dollar 
is caused by a risk premium shock, 5 simulations 
with the European Commission’s Quest model 
indicate that a 5% depreciation of the euro 
against the US dollar would add 0.3 pp to 
inflation in 2005 in the euro area (and 0.2 pp in 
2006). The depreciation would also add 0.2 pp to 
euro-area GDP growth in 2005 (zero effect in 
2006). 
In addition to the recent depreciation of the 
euro, another factor which should support the 
euro-area economy during the next few months 
is the likely recovery of the world economy 
during second half of the year. As discussed later 
in this issue, there are early signs that the trade 
                                                     
5  Reflecting a shift in preferences of international investors 
to dollar-denominated assets. 
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slowdown that began in spring last year may now 
be coming gradually to an end.  
Supporting the scenario of a progressive pick-up 
of activity in the euro-area during the second half 
of the year is the fact that most manufacturing 
indicators have recently come in better than 
expected. Regarding hard data, euro-area 
industrial new orders increased in April for the 
first time this year and available data at the 
Member State level show a further increase in 
Germany in May. Moreover, after two months of 
contraction, industrial production increased again 
in April (0.6% m-o-m). The rise could actually 
have been stronger if it had not been held down 
by a sharp contraction in the volatile energy 
sector. Some of the most recent business survey 
results also show tentative signs of a somewhat 
better outlook. In June, the index for inventories 
improved, ECFIN’s Business Climate Indicator 
picked up slightly after five months of steady 
decline and the Purchasing Managers’ Index for 
manufacturing recovered to just below 50. 
However, the short-term prospects for euro-area 
manufacturing sector remain fragile as some 
parts of the manufacturing survey remain 
lacklustre. For instance, manufacturers’ 
expectations regarding their selling price remain 
depressed, which, in combination with rising 
input prices, does not bode well for profit 
margins.  
Overall, although the first-quarter performance 
of euro-area GDP was as projected in the spring 
forecast, subdued business and consumer 
confidence during the second quarter suggest 
that annual growth in 2005 may turn out 
somewhat lower than foreseen. The mid-point 
estimates of the latest indicator-based forecast of 
quarterly GDP growth6 are below the quarterly 
rates of the spring forecast: 0.3% q-o-q in the 
second quarter and 0.4% in the third, against 
0.5% for both quarters in the spring forecast. 
Should these mid-point values materialise and 
should the last quarter of the year be in line with 
the spring forecasts, the projection for annual 
GDP growth in 2005 would be cut by 0.3 pp to 
1.3%. The scenario of a return to potential 
growth in the second half of the year is 
supported by the very recent improvement in 
                                                     
6http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/
euroareagdp_en.htm 
survey indicators for the manufacturing sector 
and the sustained growth of the services sector. 
Graph 4: GDP growth, euro area 
(q-o-q changes in % – 2001Q3 to 2005Q3) 
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(1) ECFIN’s indicator-based forecast model. 
Source: Commission services. 
Risks to the central scenario of the spring 
forecast remain 
The return to potential growth is subject to risks 
linked to the international environment and 
consumer confidence. Regarding the 
international environment, the global imbalances 
are the main (downside) risk. Consumer 
confidence could be an upside risk, if an 
excessive reaction to rising energy prices is 
avoided. Finally, investment in equipment and in 
construction are subject to specific risks. 
The evolution of the capacity utilisation rate in 
manufacturing casts a shadow on the outlook for 
equipment investment. At 80.9% in April 2005, 
capacity utilisation has fallen back to its April 
2002 level, increasing the potential for the 
corporate sector to meet any additional demand 
through a higher utilisation rate of existing 
capacity instead of triggering new investment. 
Construction investment, on the other hand, may 
surprise on the upside in the short-term. Indeed, 
among the sources of the construction boom in 
many countries is the rapid rise in housing prices 
fuelled by very low real interest rates. This seems 
to be true especially for Spain, where the real 
interest rate is close to zero or negative. In 
contrast, real interest rates are higher in Germany 
as inflation is lower. However, the medium-term 
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risk is on the downside, since local house prices 
have reached unsustainable levels in many 
Member States (see also the Focus section on 
“Housing and the business cycle” in this issue).  
Early signs that the soft patch in the global 
economy may be coming to an end 
After the period of strong growth observed in 
late 2003 and early 2004, the global economy has 
decelerated gradually since spring 2004. The year-
on-year rate of increase in world trade, as 
estimated by CPB Netherlands bureau of 
economic policy analysis, peaked at around 15% 
in mid-2004 and has since been on a declining 
trend, falling below 5% at the end of the first 
quarter of 2005. However, a significant rebound 
in trade volume was registered in April which 
saw the strongest m-o-m growth since June 2004 
(Graph 5). 
Graph 5: World trade  
(y-o-y % change in volume–Jan 2000 to April 2005 ) 
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Source: CPB Netherlands bureau of economic policy analysis. 
According to the latest reading of the quarterly 
World Economic Survey from May 2005, the 
world economic climate deteriorated for the fifth 
consecutive quarter, but remained above its long-
term average. However, the global Purchasing 
Managers’ Index for manufacturing, which had 
been on a declining trend for much of the last 
year, bounced back in June (Graph 6). Together 
with more positive news from the US and 
Japanese economies, these developments could 
be an early sign that the soft patch in the global 
economy is gradually coming to an end. 
Graph 6: Developments in global manufacturing 
(Jan 2000 to May 2005) 
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Source: OECD, EcoWin. 
The US economy is in the fourth year of a 
cyclical upturn with growth continuing at a solid 
rate. Following 3.8% annualised growth in the 
first quarter, the expansion has apparently slowed 
somewhat in the second quarter following an 
inventory correction and a general cooling down 
of activity in the manufacturing sector. Growth 
continues to be based on robust domestic 
demand for both consumer and capital goods. 
Recent improvements in consumer confidence 
and the ISM business surveys may bode an end 
to the second quarter “soft patch”, although 
rising energy prices may still weaken domestic 
demand more substantially. Foreign trade has so 
far contributed negatively to growth, but the 
latest monthly data suggest an improving export 
performance. Consumer spending is supported 
by solid growth in real disposable personal 
income (up 3.2% over the twelve months to 
May), partly a result of continuing moderate 
improvement in the labour market (1.5% growth 
in payroll employment in the twelve months to 
May). The wealth effect from continued house 
price inflation (12.5% between 2004 Q1 and 
2005 Q1) appears also to support consumer 
spending. Households have further reduced their 
saving out of income in 2005, resulting in a 
saving rate of 0.75% of disposable personal 
income in the first five months of the year 
compared to 1.3% in 2004. 
Headline inflation (the y-on-y increase in the 
overall consumer price index) was 2.8% in May. 
Core inflation is considerably lower due to the 
exclusion of energy prices. The Federal Reserve’s 
favourite inflation measure – the core price index 
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for personal consumption expenditure – has only 
increased by 1.6% over the past year. However, 
in the first five months of this year, this measure 
of core inflation has risen to an annual rate of 
2.2%. The Federal Reserve considered  pressures 
on inflation to be elevated when it  raised its 
target for the federal funds rate to 3.25% on 30 
June. This was the ninth 25 basis-point increase 
in the policy rate since June 2004.  
In spite of rising short-term rates, overall 
financial conditions continue to be relatively 
accommodative since long-term rates have fallen 
since June 2004. The trends in the so-called ‘twin 
deficits’ have recently diverged. While the current 
account deficit has continued to rise and reached 
6.4% of GDP in the first quarter of 2005, the 
fiscal deficit of general government has fallen to 
3.1% of GDP in the same quarter, mainly due to 
higher tax revenues. Higher-than-expected tax 
revenues have continued into the second quarter 
and will provide some further cyclical 
improvement of the budget deficit.  
Japanese output growth accelerated from 1.4% 
in 2003 to 2.7% last year, the fastest rate since 
1996. This happened despite the economy 
experiencing a technical recession in the middle 
of 2004. In the first quarter of 2005, the Japanese 
economy rebounded strongly with GDP growing 
at 4.9% (annualised rate) thanks to a significant 
recovery in domestic demand. Both private 
capital and private consumption expenditures 
increased rapidly after several quarters of 
weakness. By contrast, net external trade 
subtracted 0.1 pp from overall growth, partly 
reflecting declining exports. The strong 
performance of the Japanese economy at the 
beginning of 2005 should however be seen in the 
light of temporary contractionary factors that 
dampened growth at the end of last year, when 
the country was hit by an earthquake and 
unusually adverse weather conditions. 
Also, the strong rebound in growth is partly 
explained by the GDP deflator, which showed a 
decline in prices of 1% y-on-y. Core deflation is 
decelerating very slowly, partly due to one-off 
factors. Given the very slow pace of deceleration 
of underlying deflation, the year-on-year change 
in core CPI is unlikely to settle firmly into 
positive territory before the turn of the year. The 
Bank of Japan has committed itself to keeping in 
place the current quantitative framework, which 
implies zero interest rates, until deflation has 
clearly come to an end. 
Looking ahead, the Japanese economy is 
expected to continue to expand moderately in 
2005. Recent data releases suggest that domestic 
demand might be more resilient in the coming 
quarters with the global economic environment 
remaining supportive of GDP growth. Indeed, 
the increase observed in May in the proportion 
of full-time workers combined with 
unemployment trending downwards might result 
in higher household income and consumer 
spending at some point. On the corporate front, 
the high level of capacity utilisation and strong 
increase in profits should support business 
investment spending. Moreover, the June Tankan 
survey report indicated a broadening of business 
confidence for the second and third quarter of 
this year. Given the strong performance 
registered in the first quarter of 2005, the 
Commission forecast for 2005 GDP annual 
growth of 1.1% is probably on the low side. 
China’s GDP continued to grow at a strong 
pace in early 2005, growing by 9.5% in the first 
quarter. Economic indicators in April and May 
suggest that this trend has likely continued in the 
second quarter. The source of growth has 
partially shifted away from investment towards 
net exports and, to a lesser extent, consumption. 
Import growth decelerated sharply in the first 
five months of 2005, partly due to the very 
strong import growth last year, but also due to a 
slowdown in investment growth and an increase 
in domestic capacity. Faster urban and rural 
income growth has been an important support to 
consumer spending. While investment growth 
has decelerated in many overheating sectors 
(essentially the metal industry), it has accelerated 
in bottleneck and government-supported sectors, 
such as energy generation, utilities and transport. 
Investment in the real estate sector has continued 
to be very strong, despite government measures 
to curb it. Notwithstanding higher raw material 
and energy costs, inflation continues to be 
moderate, averaging 2.8% in the first quarter of 
2005 and decelerating to 1.8% in May. The 
Commission expects growth to remain robust at 
8.6% in 2005. 
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Regarding other emerging economies, GDP 
growth in the rest of Asia looks likely to 
moderate in the coming quarters, with Asian 
exports trending down as growth decelerates in 
the USA and China, two key export markets for 
final and intermediate goods. Growth in Latin 
America is expected to slow down somewhat 
from the historically very rapid growth registered 
in 2004, partly as a result of monetary tightening, 
the expected deceleration in global growth and 
the gradual end to the post-crisis rebound in 
some countries. Rising oil prices should sustain 
growth in oil-exporting countries, such as those 
in the Commonwealth of Independent States 
and the Middle East.  
Monetary and financial conditions  
Monetary conditions in the euro area, as 
measured by the Monetary Conditions Index 
(MCI), continued to improve in the second 
quarter of 2005 (Graph 7). Movements in the 
MCI were driven by exchange rate changes as 
real short-term rates have been close to zero, well 
below the average level registered in the 1990s, 
for more than two years. 
Graph 7: Euro-area monetary conditions  
(inverted scale – Jan 1998 to May 2005) 
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Source: Commission services. 
In June, market expectations, as derived from 
future contracts, started to price in the possibility 
of a rate cut. However, since the beginning of 
July, these market expectations have begun to 
dissolve slightly, as recent indicators pointed to 
an acceleration of economic activity. Still, 
compared to the end of March, there has been a 
large shift of market expectations. At the end of 
March markets still expected four rate hikes by 
25 basis points each until the end of 2006 
(Graph 8).  
Graph 8: 3-month Euribor future implied rates (LIFE) 
(in %) 
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Source: Commission services. 
In the USA, the Federal Reserve has raised 
interest rates by 225 basis points since 30 June 
2004, bringing the target for the federal funds 
rate to 3.25 percent. Financial markets still expect 
a further tightening over the coming months, 
albeit at a slower speed. Market expectations as 
derived from future contracts are now pricing in 
one or two more steps by 25 basis points each 
before the end of the year.  
Graph 9: 10-year government bond yields 
(daily data – 1 Jan 2003 to 12 July 2005) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Since the end of the first quarter of 2005, long-
term government bond yields in the euro area 
and the USA have declined further. At the 
beginning of June, the yields on 10-year 
government-bonds had reached levels below that 
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of February when Greenspan called the level of 
long-term bond yields a “conundrum”. In recent 
weeks, long-term bond yields re-bounced slightly. 
In the euro area, government bond yields have 
reached historically low levels with the German 
government bond yield falling to 3.10% on 
27 June. On 12 July, it stood at 3.23%. The 
recent decline seems to be mainly driven by 
weaker-than-expected leading indicators and 
lower inflation expectations, the latter in spite of 
the recent surge in oil prices. Developments in 
indicators of inflation expectations derived from 
financial markets (such as break-even inflation 
rates) suggest that market participants’ inflation 
expectations have significantly eased since the 
end of April. Furthermore, in June, speculations 
about the prospects of an ECB rate cut 
contributed to the decline of bond yields. With 
short-term interest rates fairly stable, the decline 
of bond yields led to a flattening of the yield 
curve also in the euro area. 
In the USA, the interest rate hikes by the Federal 
Reserve and the decline of government bond 
yields also resulted in a sharp flattening of the 
yield curve. On 12 July, the US 10-year 
government bond yield stood at 4.15%. Three 
factors seem to have contributed to the further 
decline of US government bond yields: softer 
macroeconomic data at the beginning of May; a 
flight to quality due to speculation about hedge 
funds’ losses in credit markets following the 
downgrading of Ford and General Motors and 
lowered inflation expectations. 
While recent developments can be explained by 
the factors mentioned above, additional factors 
have been put forward to explain the structurally 
low level of government bond yields on both 
sides of the Atlantic. These include a slowdown 
in global growth, Asian central bank buying; 
pension fund buying in order to better match 
long-term liabilities with long-term assets; higher 
demand for fixed-income assets from an ageing 
population; and a predominance of short 
positions on the part of bond investors, who 
have been forced to cover as the “conundrum” 
failed to resolve itself in their favour. 
Graph 10: Yield curve (10-year minus 3-month interbank) 
(daily data– 1 Jan 2003 to 12 July 2005) 
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Source: Commission services. 
 
Graph 11: Nominal effective and bilateral USD/EUR 
exchange rate (1/1/03=100 – 1 Jan 03 to 12 July 05)  
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Source: Commission services. 
In the second quarter of 2005, the euro exchange 
rate resumed the downward trend against the 
dollar that had started at the beginning of the 
year. Over the quarter, the euro lost more than 
7% against the US dollar, declining from 
1.30 USD/EUR at the end of March to 
1.21 USD/EUR at the end of June. After 
reaching a 14-months-low of 1.19 USD/EUR on 
5 July, the euro re-bounced and stood at close to 
1.22 on 12 July. While the weakening of the euro 
was heightened by the results of the French and 
Dutch referenda, it also reflected the continuing 
uneven prospects for domestic demand across 
the euro area, and the still relatively strong 
cyclical factors supporting the US dollar. With 
speculations about an ECB rate cut and the 
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Federal Reserve’s hiking cycle, interest rate 
differentials have become the dominant theme in 
currency markets this year, helping the dollar 
stage an unexpected rally. 
Graph 12: Stock indices (index 1/1/03=100) 
(daily data– 1 Jan 2003 to 12 July 2005)  
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Source: Commission services. 
Global stock markets suffered sharp declines in 
mid-April, as concerns mounted in the USA over 
corporate profits and global growth prospects. A 
round of soft economic indicators undermined 
investor confidence, as indicators of consumer 
confidence, import prices and regional 
manufacturing disappointed market participants. 
Within a few days, stock markets in the USA and 
the euro area lost between 4 and 5%. Since then, 
however, stock markets have recovered after 
recent data releases indicated better-than-
expected economic activity in the USA. In the 
euro area, stock markets withstood weaker-than-
expected leading indicators and even continued 
to rise after the “no” votes in France and the 
Netherlands, due to robust corporate profit 
growth and historically low levels of risk-free 
interest rates. European exporters’ stocks also 
profited from the recent fall of the euro 
exchange rate. In June, stock markets in the US, 
Japan and euro area had more than offset the 
losses of the second half of April. After the 
London bombings, global stock markets initially 
lost around 4% but re-bounced in the course of 
the day, closing with a loss of less than 1%. Stock 
markets in the US even closed with some gains. 
On 12 July, the EuroStoxx was some 15% above 
its 2004 average level.  
2. Recent developments in inflation 
Headline inflation is close to 2% 
In 2005, euro-area annual HICP inflation has 
remained relatively stable. Headline inflation rose 
from 1.9% in January 2004 to 2.4% in December 
(Graph 13). It subsequently fell to 1.9% in 
January 2005. Since then, headline inflation has 
remained flat at 2.1%, except for a brief 
downward blip to 1.9% in May.  
Graph 13: Headline and core HICP inflation, euro area 
(y-o-y changes in % – Jan 2001 to May 2005) 
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(1) Flash estimate for June. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Among the main components to headline HICP, 
the highest annual rates of inflation in recent 
months were observed in housing, alcohol and 
tobacco, transport and education.  
¾ Housing inflation has continued to rise 
recently from an average annual rate for 2004 
of 2.5% to 3.7% in January and 4.7% in April, 
but has come down slightly to 4.3% in May. 
For May this equates to a contribution of 
about 0.6 pp to total HICP (Graph 14).  
¾ Inflation in alcohol and tobacco products has 
come down significantly since last year, from 
an average of 8.1% in 2004, to 7.5% in 
January and 3.9% in May (a contribution of 
about 0.2 pp). The deceleration is attributable 
to base effects related to increases in tax rates 
in 2004. 
¾ Transport prices are growing at high and 
rising rates. While the annual rate of inflation 
for that component averaged 2.3% in 2004, it 
stood at 3.2% in January and rose to 4.2% in 
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April (0.6 pp contribution). In May it fell back 
again to a rate of 3% (0.5 pp). These 
developments largely reflect recent 
fluctuations in oil prices. 
¾ The education component has shown 
continually high inflation rates in the past few 
months (3.4% from January to May). 
However, due to its small weight in the 
consumption basket its contribution to 
overall inflation was less than 0.1 pp in May. 
Graph 14: Contribution from main components to 
headline HICP (y-o-y inflation, euro area in %) 
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(1) The “Other main components” are food, clothing, household 
equipment, health, education, hotels and restaurants, and 
miscellaneous. 
Source: Commission services. 
Core inflation is falling 
While headline inflation has been relatively 
stable, core inflation has declined. Core inflation 
can be measured in a number of different ways. 
The most commonly used measure of core 
inflation is headline inflation excluding energy 
and unprocessed food, two elements that have 
traditionally been very volatile. A second measure 
of core inflation is the so called weighted median of 
inflation.  
Graph 13 shows the developments of these two 
core inflation measures together with headline 
HICP. The two measures have recently shown 
somewhat different trends. Core inflation 
(measured as HICP without energy and 
unprocessed food) accelerated during the first 
half of 2004. It then experienced an almost 
uninterrupted fall from mid-2004 to April 2005 
before rebounding slightly in May to 1.6%. In 
contrast, core inflation, as measured by the 
weighted median, has experienced an almost 
uninterrupted decline since the beginning of 
2004, falling from a level of 1.9% in January 2004 
to 1.5% in January 2005. It has remained at this 
level for four consecutive months. In May, 
weighted median inflation rose slightly to 1.6%. 
Some inflationary pressure from oil prices 
The recent surge in oil prices has driven up euro-
area energy inflation (Graph 15). Changes in oil 
prices affect euro-area HICP inflation in 
different ways.  
A change in oil prices affects headline inflation 
directly via the HICP’s energy component, which 
accounts for about 9% of the consumption 
basket. In the first five months of 2005 energy 
HICP inflation was 8.0%. This corresponds to an 
average contribution of 0.7 pp to headline HICP. 
Graph 15: Oil prices and energy inflation in the euro 
area (Jan 2002 to May 2005) 
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(1) Y-o-y changes in % in the energy component of the HICP 
Source: Commission services. 
Oil price changes can also affect inflation 
indirectly via their impact on the production 
costs of sectors using energy. The indirect pass-
through of higher oil prices in the transport 
services sector is generally relatively rapid. 
Inflation in transport services has also risen 
rapidly in the recent months. However, evidence 
of indirect effects in producer price inflation 
remains limited. There have not, so far, been any 
significant signs of pass-through of higher energy 
costs into consumer good prices. The year-on-
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year inflation in the consumer good sector even 
decelerated during the first quarter of 2005 
(Graph 17). 
Graph 16: Contribution of energy to headline HICP 
inflation, euro area  (Jan 2004 to May 2005) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Two factors can explain the limited extent of 
cost increases observed so far. First, it takes time 
for cost increases to be transmitted down the 
production chain. Second, the past appreciation 
of the euro and modest growth of unit labour 
costs have partly offset the impact of higher oil 
prices. 
Graph 17: Producer price inflation in the euro area  
(y-o-y changes in % – Jan 2002 to April 2005) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Finally, an oil price change can affect inflation via 
changes in inflation expectations in the economy. 
Second-round effects on inflation from this 
source have so far been limited. Despite a 
continued rise in oil prices in 2004, there is only 
limited sign of inflationary effects from changes 
in inflation expectations. For instance, according 
to DG ECFIN’s Business and Consumer Survey, 
inflation expectations remain relatively contained 
despite a modest rise for households (Graph 18).  
Graph 18: price expectations in surveys,  
euro area (Jan 2001 to May 2005) 
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(1) Price trends over next 12 months. 
(2) Selling price expectations for the months ahead. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Furthermore, developments in inflation-indexed 
bonds indicate that inflation expectations of 
financial market participants remain contained. 
The ten-year euro-area break-even inflation as 
derived from French inflation-indexed bonds fell 
below 2 percent in June, the first time since 
September 2003 (Graph 19). 
Graph 19: Inflationary expectations embedded in 
French index-linked bonds   
(in % – Mar 2002 to June 2005) 
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
2.4
Mar-02 Sep-02 Mar-03 Sep-03 Mar-04 Sep-04 Mar-05  
Source: Ecowin. 
 European Commission 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs  
 
 
 
- 17 - 
Increases in taxes and administered prices 
remain important 
In the first five months of 2005, hikes in indirect 
taxes and administered prices, as measured by 
inflation in tobacco and health services, have 
added about 0.4 pp to headline inflation 
(Graph 20). While smaller than last year, this is 
still significantly above the level of 0.2 pp 
registered on average during the 1996-2002 
period. 
Graph 20: Tobacco products and health services 
inflation in the euro area (Jan 2004 to May 2005) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Past appreciation of the euro 
Over the past three years, the appreciation of the 
euro has been a significant factor contributing to 
disinflationary forces in the euro area. As can be 
seen from Graph 21, developments in the 
effective exchange rate and in extra-euro-area 
import prices are strongly related. An 
appreciation of the euro appears to have a strong 
negative effect on extra-area import prices. 
Looking at the end of the series, we can see that, 
over the past few months, the euro has begun to 
depreciate. While figures on import prices for the 
beginning of 2005 are not yet available, we can 
infer that this depreciation will have put upward 
pressure on import prices during this time. 
While the effect on import prices is relatively 
rapid, the pass-through to consumer prices is 
much slower (1.5 to 2 years, according to 
Commission estimates). Thus, the disinflationary 
effects of the appreciation of the euro, 
experienced last year, can be expected to last well 
into the end of 2005 and the beginning of 2006. 
Graph 21: Imported disinflation, euro area 
(base 1999=100 – Jan 2002 to May 2005) 
100
104
108
112
116
Feb-02 Aug-02 Feb-03 Aug-03 Feb-04 Aug-04 Feb-05
80
90
100
110
120
Extra-euro area import prices (1)
Effective exchange rate (rhs) (2)
 
(1) Price index of imports of consumption goods. The latest import 
price data is from December 2004. 
(2) Inverted scale. 
Source: Commission services. 
Modest growth in labour costs 
Modest growth in labour costs continues to 
contribute to price stability in the euro area. The 
annual percentage change in unit labour costs has 
fallen over the last few years, from an average of 
2.3% in 2001 to 0.9% in 2004. Looking at 
quarterly figures, we can see that growth in unit 
labour costs fell from 2.4% y-o-y in the second 
quarter of 2003 to 0.5% in the third quarter of 
2004, its lowest rate for 4 years (Graph 22). In 
the last quarter of 2004, it rose again to 1.2%. 
To a large extent, developments in labour costs 
reflect movements in labour productivity which, 
after a period of significant increases, began to 
slow at the end of 2004. Growth in labour 
productivity increased steadily from 0.1% in the 
second quarter of 2003 to 1.6% in the same 
quarter of 2004, subsequently falling to 1.2% and 
0.7% in the third and fourth quarters, 
respectively. Moderation in unit labour costs is 
also – though to a lesser extent – due to weak 
growth in total compensation per employee. 
Data on negotiated wages compiled by the ECB 
(available with a smaller lag than wage data from 
national accounts) show that wage moderation 
continued in the first quarter of 2005.  
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Graph 22: Unit labour costs, euro area 
(y-o-y changes in % - 2001Q1 to 2004Q4) 
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(1) Ratio of compensation per employee to real GDP per employee. 
(2) Total compensation per employee. 
(3) Ratio of real GDP to employment. 
Source: Commission services and ECB. 
Inflation differentials persist but have 
narrowed recently 
In the first five months of 2005, the lowest 
annual rates of headline HICP inflation have 
been observed in Finland, Netherlands and 
Germany, and the highest rates have been 
observed in Luxembourg, Greece and Spain 
(Graph 23). In Finland, the average HICP 
inflation rate has so far in 2005 been about 0.5%, 
while it has reached about 3.4% in Luxembourg. 
Graph 23: HICP inflation, euro-area Member States 
(Average y-o-y % changes) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Graph 24 displays two measures of inflation 
dispersion across the euro-area Member States, 
the unweighted standard deviation and the 
range.7 Both measures indicate that the inflation 
dispersion reached a bottom at the end of 1999 
and another in the turn of 2003-04. For instance, 
the average range was just above 2 pp during 
each of the two periods. In 2004, the inflation 
dispersion increased again. This had to some 
extent to do with changes in indirect taxation and 
administered prices. For instance, cuts in alcohol 
taxes in Finland entailed a substantial 
deceleration of inflation there. From March to 
May this year, however, inflation dispersion 
within the euro area narrowed somewhat. The 
average range in this period was 2.6 pp compared 
to 3.1 pp in 2004. 
Graph 24: HICP inflation dispersion across euro-area 
Member States (in % and pp – Jan 1996 to May 2005) 
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Source: Commission services. 
                                                     
7  The range is here defined as the difference (in percentage 
points) between the maximum and minimum values. 
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Focus 
II. Growth differences in the euro area  
In spite of a recent rise in growth dispersion among Germany, France, Italy and Spain, growth differences in the euro area are 
not unusually high by historical standards or in comparison with other monetary unions. Growth differences reflect contrasting 
cyclical and structural developments. Sources of cyclical differences are economic disturbances with temporarily differentiated 
impacts, such as trade fluctuation and swings in exchange rates, equity and oil price developments. Business cycles in the euro-
area Member States are, however, relatively closely aligned, even though important differences in the transmission of monetary 
and fiscal policy remain. Failure to adjust rapidly to economic shocks could trigger prolonged periods of overheating and 
overcooling, damaging also potential growth. Disappointingly, the adjustment mechanism works only very slowly. Differences 
in potential output growth have become entrenched and pose an increasing problem, particularly as growth differences cannot 
be  explained by fast growth in  catching-up economies. The most important determinant of differences in potential growth is 
the labour contribution, followed by differences in TFP growth. 
Six years after the introduction of the euro, the 
dispersion in growth rates of Member States has 
prompted a broad debate about growth 
differences in the euro area. At the same time, 
the euro area has gone through a comparatively 
weak spell of growth. Some Member States, such 
as Germany and Italy, have been acutely affected, 
while others, like France, Spain and several 
smaller euro-area countries, have experienced 
more benign economic conditions. In the light of 
these developments, this note analyses the nature 
and extent of growth differences in the euro area. 
A first section compares the current growth 
differences in the euro area with historical 
developments and with regional differences in 
other currency areas. A second section separates 
cyclical from structural growth dispersion. It 
analyses differences in the transmission of 
common shocks, the functioning of adjustment 
mechanisms and the structural reasons behind 
widening long-term growth differences.  
1. Growth dispersion in the euro area 
Although it has attracted widespread coverage, 
the current dispersion of growth rates in the euro 
area is routine and normal. Since the mid-
nineties, the average annual growth deviation in 
the euro area has fallen (Graph 25). This was 
influenced in particular by a moderation in 
Ireland’s very high growth rate. Dispersion was 
not constant, however, and increased notably in 
1996/97 when a recovery started. This was 
followed by a period of renewed convergence of 
growth rates which lasted until 2000. In 2003, 
dispersion peaked again, as the latest recovery 
started; growth rates in the various euro-area 
countries have again become more similar since 
2004. 
Graph 25: Dispersion in annual growth in the euro 
area(1) (standard deviation in % – 1980 to 2004) 
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(1) Euro 12: all euro MS; Euro 10: MS excluding IE and LU; 
Euro 4: DE, FR, IT, ES. 
Source:, Commission services. 
Compared with other currency areas, euro-area 
growth dispersion is also not unusually large. 
Graph 26 shows that growth differences within 
the United States and Germany have historically 
been as high as the dispersion across the euro-
area Member States. These comparisons should 
not, however, be over-interpreted: higher factor 
mobility, financial integration and fiscal transfers 
make it in principle easier to deal with dispersion 
within those countries than among euro-area 
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members.8 It should also be noted that US states 
and Bundesländer are on average smaller and 
more specialised than euro-area Member States. 
Graph 26: Differences in growth dispersion (1) 
(euro area, Germany, USA) (in % – 1992 to 2004) 
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(1) Euro 12: all euro members 4; Euro 4: DE, FR, IT, ES; 
Germany: 16 Bundesländer, USA: 50 States, no index for 1998 due 
to break in series. 
Source: Commission services. 
Variation indices of growth are sensitive to the 
country groups that are chosen. In the past, 
substantially divergent behaviour could be 
observed between different country groupings, in 
particular between the large Member States and 
the group including all euro-area countries, but 
also when outliers (in this case Ireland and 
Luxembourg) are removed from the analysis  
(Graph 25). The interpretation of dispersion 
indices therefore hinges on the relative weight 
one attaches to economies of different sizes. 
However, relatively low recent growth dispersion 
among the 12 Member States masks a significant 
and increasing long-term growth divergence. 
Countries that had above-average growth in the 
last five years usually had it already in the early or 
late nineties, pointing to a high importance of 
structural factors (Graph 27). There are only a 
few significant changes that affect the relative 
ranking of countries and, with it, growth 
dispersion. Notably, Germany’s unification-
boosted over-performance turned into a decade-
long underperformance. By contrast, Greece’s 
                                                     
8  On the other hand, institutions within a country might 
not be flexible enough to allow regions with growth rates 
that differ substantially from the country average to 
adjust. This might explain persistent growth differences 
within countries.   
below-average growth in the nineties turned into 
the second-highest growth rate in the last five 
years. The next section analyses the drivers of 
short- and long-term growth differences across 
countries in monetary union. 
Graph 27: Growth in the euro area by country  
(difference from Euro-12, average in % p.a.) 
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(1) Growth rate of non-weighted average of euro members set to 0. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
2. Determinants of growth dispersion 
Growth dispersion due to differences in the 
business cycle and long-term trends 
Growth dispersion is not constant; it is 
influenced by the cyclical position of the euro 
area and shocks with an asymmetric impact. 
Clearly, however, cyclical dispersion has become 
less important since the early nineties. European 
business cycles have become more synchronised 
over the last decade.9 In particular, the business 
cycles and GDP turning points of the five largest 
euro-area Member States are very similar to those 
of the euro area as a whole, supporting the 
assertion that the economies of the countries 
concerned are highly interdependent (Graph 28). 
A fairly high degree of business cycle 
synchronisation can also be detected for smaller 
euro-area members (Graph 29). Greece is the 
exception with an unsynchronised cycle, which 
can be partly explained by the country’s more 
                                                     
9  The cyclical component of growth can be calculated with 
the same econometric techniques used for determining 
potential output, notably the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter.  
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recent convergence and accession to the euro 
area, as well as the special influence of the 
Olympic Games on the cycle.10  
Graph 28: Output gaps in five largest euro-area 
countries (in % of trend GDP – 1996Q1 to 2004Q4) 
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Source: Commission services. 
 
Graph 29: Output gaps in six small euro-area countries 
(in % of trend GDP – 1996Q1 to 2004Q4) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Given the decreasing importance of cyclical 
factors, trend growth has more recently explained 
up to 80% of the overall dispersion (see 
Graph 30). 
                                                     
10 Different methods, such as the dating of business cycles, 
also arrive at a close harmonisation of recent cycles. 
Graph 30: Share of trend growth dispersion in total 
annual euro-area growth dispersion (1) 
(in % – 1982 to 2005)  
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(1) Excluding Luxembourg and Ireland. 
(2) Shares are calculated covariance with total growth differences.  
Source: Commission services. 
 
Short-term factors determining cyclical 
growth dispersion 
Although economic integration appears to have 
led to a more synchronised business cycle, a 
number of short-term factors have impacted on 
growth dispersion over the last few years. These 
include common shocks with an asymmetric 
impact, including most notably large fluctuations 
in the global economy, the launch of the euro, 
swings in exchange rates, equity prices and oil 
prices. It should be noted that, in the presence of 
such asymmetric shocks and due to structural 
differences among countries, some degree of 
cyclical differences is unavoidable in an 
economic and monetary union. Against this 
background, the level of output gap dispersion 
experienced in the past five years appears 
remarkably low. This is in part attributable to the 
positive effect of the European integration 
process on cyclical synchronisation. 
The asymmetric transmission of fluctuations in 
world trade explains a significant part of the 
cyclical dispersion observed. As shown in 
Graph 31, the contribution of exports to cyclical 
dispersion increased markedly in the late nineties 
and decreased again after 2000.11 
                                                     
11  It is worth stressing that national accounts do not provide 
a breakdown of exports into an extra- and an intra-euro- 
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Graph 31: Contribution of exports (1) to the total 
variance of output gaps in euro-area countries (2)  
(in % – 1991 to 2004) 
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(1) The contribution of the export to the variance of the Member 
States’ output gaps is the covariance across Member States of the 
cyclical components of exports and the output gaps (HP filter). 
(2) Variance around euro-area mean (excluding LU). 
Source: Commission services. 
 
The impact of extra-area trade on cyclical 
dispersion is influenced by significant variations 
in the openness of Member States to extra-area 
trade, and hence their exposure to fluctuations in 
the global economy. The asymmetric effect of 
trade openness on growth can be reinforced 
when the exports of euro-area members grow at 
different rates, e.g. as a result of specialisation or 
price competitiveness.12 Since the late nineties, 
there has been a fairly high degree of dispersion 
in the export performance of the individual 
Member States, which can partly be ascribed to 
price competitiveness developments and such 
factors as the geographical and sectoral 
specialisation of Member States’ exports.13  
                                                                              
area component. Estimates of the contribution of exports 
to output gap dispersion therefore cover both intra- and 
extra-area trade, which consequently blurs the analysis. 
12  See focus on “The export performance of the euro area” 
European Commission, Quarterly Report on the Euro 
Area Volume 4 No. 1 (2005). For an analysis of 
differences in Member States’ technological specialisation 
and its relation to trade performance, see also European 
Central Bank (2005) “Competitiveness and the export 
performance of the euro area”, ECB Occasional Paper 
No.  30. 
13  In the late nineties, Member States which were more 
open to trade also tended to benefit from faster export 
growth (e.g. Ireland, Austria and the Netherlands) a trend 
which strengthened the positive effect of fast growth in 
In contrast to the surge in world trade in the late 
nineties, the recovery in world trade since mid-
2003 has not been a major source of cyclical 
dispersion within the euro area, since the sectoral 
and geographical drivers of world trade seem to 
have been less asymmetric than during the 
previous phase of rapid world trade growth. In 
addition, the competitiveness adjustment 
mechanism has, to some extent, been at play.  
There is now broad agreement that the inception 
of EMU itself has been a temporary cause of 
asymmetries across Member States. These have 
been either a consequence of the interest rate 
convergence process that preceded the launch of 
the common currency or of exchange rate 
parities required economic adjustment.14  
The temporary phase of increased cyclical 
dispersion in the years around the introduction 
of the euro was accentuated by important 
differences in financial conditions. Member 
States with stronger cyclical growth received a 
further stimulus to domestic demand from lower 
real interest rates, because they tended to have 
higher inflation rates resulting from the strength 
of the upswing as well as other factors, such as 
the Balassa-Samuelson effect. However, inflation 
differences have narrowed in the past two years, 
leading to a convergence in real interest rates. It 
is noteworthy that the cross-country correlation 
between the cyclical strength of domestic 
demand and the changes in real interest rates has 
been quite small in recent years, suggesting that 
differences in real interest rate differentials no 
longer play a significant role in explaining growth 
dispersion.15 Finally, it is worth stressing that 
asymmetries in demand pressures have probably 
been reinforced by large differences in trends in 
housing prices across Member States, which in 
                                                                              
world trade on cyclical dispersion. The opposite situation 
was observed during the downturn in world trade in 
2001-02, when a higher openness to trade was generally 
associated with a weaker export performance, a factor 
which reinforced the cyclical convergence effect of the 
trade downturn.  
14  For instance, the overvaluation of the German real 
effective exchange rate relative to other Member States 
may have been substantial (Hansen, J. and W. Roeger 
(2000), “Estimation of real equilibrium exchange rates”, 
DG ECFIN Economic Papers No.  144).  
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turn were much affected by the strong reductions 
in nominal interest rates during the run-up to 
EMU (see focus on housing market). The 
sensitivity of private consumption to housing 
wealth varies significantly across Member States. 
Graph 32: Contribution pf private consumption to the 
total variance of the output gaps of Germany, France, 
Italy and Spain (in %–1996Q1 to 2004Q4) 
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Source: Commission services. 
The euro area has experienced a number of 
additional shocks that may have contributed to 
cyclical dispersion, albeit probably only modestly. 
In theory, surging oil prices could be a source of 
growth differences as oil intensities vary 
significantly across Member States. In practice, 
the significant differences in the contribution of 
energy to HICP inflation do not seem to have 
been a major source of dispersion in national 
consumption growth.16 In a similar vein, the 
appreciation of the euro since 2000 may have 
been a source of cyclical dispersion as some 
countries are more exposed to extra-euro area 
trade than others. However, it is difficult to 
establish reliable empirical estimates of this effect 
due to the problem of disentangling the impact 
                                                                              
15  Furthermore, it is important to stress that investment and 
consumption decisions are based on anticipated rather 
than observed real interest rates. For a discussion of the 
possible divergence between the two measures and its 
impact on the competitiveness adjustment channel, see 
Otmar Issing, “One size fits all! A single monetary policy 
for the euro area”, speech at the International Research 
Forum, Frankfurt am Main, Germany, 20 May 2005. 
16  In particular, there was no significant correlation between 
Member States’ consumption growth and losses in 
household purchasing power attributable to higher oil 
prices in 2004.  
of the euro’sppreciation from the concurrent 
recovery in world trade.  
Graph 33: Household gross savings rate 
(2001 to 2004; change in percentage points since 2000)  
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
BE DE EL ES FR IT NL AT PT FI
2001
2002
2003
2004
 
Source: Commission services. 
Particularly in the four biggest euro-area 
economies, different developments in private 
consumption growth have been an important 
source of recent cyclical growth dispersion 
(Graph 32). These differences in household 
spending patterns are linked to divergent growth 
in disposable income amplified by divergent 
savings behaviour. Graph 33 shows remarkable 
differences in consumption smoothing reflected 
in the degree to which savings rates have 
changed across countries since the end of the 
ICT bubble in 2000. In case of the Netherlands 
at one extreme, the saving rate rose by 4 pp until 
2004 while at the other extreme in Greece it fell 
by 2 pp. Rising housing prices may partly explain 
why savings rates in Spain and France have not 
risen in the past few years. In other countries, 
stagnating consumer confidence has led to 
lacklustre consumption growth during the 
current recovery. This was, in turn influenced by 
the prolonged downturn, sluggish developments 
in the labour market as well as the budgetary 
situation in some Member States, and the 
uncertainty associated with reforms affecting 
permanent income. 
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Asymmetric impact of policy impulses 
Differences in the transmission of monetary 
policy remain a possible cause of cyclical 
asymmetries in the euro area.17 Changes in short-
term interest rates may have a weaker effect on 
activity in Belgium, Germany, France, the 
Netherlands, and Finland and may be more 
potent in Italy, Ireland, Spain, Greece and 
Austria.18 Although EMU may have fuelled some 
convergence, differences remain in the response 
of short-term bank lending rates to money 
market rates across countries.19 Furthermore, 
monetary transmission through a “housing” 
channel may have increased in the current cycle. 
In particular, a study by the OECD concludes 
that monetary transmission may be stronger in 
euro countries with flexible mortgage markets 
than in economies where such financial products 
are less developed.20 
There are few signs that discretionary budgetary 
policies have been an important source of 
cyclical disparities since the launch of EMU 
(Graph 34) though before they tended to be pro- 
rather than counter-cyclical, thereby exacerbating 
cyclical differences rather than reducing them. 
Automatic stabilisers work in the opposite 
direction and reduce the cyclical divergence in 
the euro area. The size of this dampening effect 
is relatively large in the euro area but can vary 
considerably across Member States. It depends 
                                                     
17  Extensive research on this topic was undertaken by the 
Monetary Transmission Network, which  was created in 
1999 to study the transmission of monetary policy in the 
newly formed euro area. The output of the MTN consists 
of contributions by economists from the ECB and all 
national central banks of the Eurosystem. 
18  Van Els, P., A. Locarno, J. Morgan and J.-P. Villetelle 
(2001), “Monetary policy transmission in the euro area: 
what do aggregate and national structural models tell us?”, 
ECB Working Paper No. 94, 2001.  
19  See Kleimeier, S. and H. Sander (2002), “European 
financial market integration: evidence on the emergence 
of a single eurozone retail banking market”, paper 
presented at the 29th Annual Meeting of the European 
Finance Association, Berlin, August 2002 and Angeloni, I. 
and M. Ehrmann (2003),”Monetary policy transmission in 
the euro area: any change after EMU?”, ECB Working 
Paper No. 240. 
20  Hoeller, P., C. Giorno and C. de la Maisonneuve (2004), 
“One money, one cycle? Making monetary union a 
smoother ride”, OECD Economics Department Working 
Paper No. 401, 2004. 
on both the size of the government sector and 
the nature of the tax-benefit systems on the one 
hand, and the nature of the economic 
disturbance on the other.  
Graph 34: Differences in the output gap and the fiscal 
stance (in %) 
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(1) Change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance as a share of 
GDP – a positive signs indicates a fiscal tightening. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Structural factors determining growth 
dispersion 
The dispersion in potential output growth among 
euro-area members is presently larger than any 
observed in the last two decades. There is also an 
increasing cross-country heterogeneity in the 
sources of GDP growth. The heterogeneity of 
the sources of demand in the euro-area economy 
that was already noted at the cyclical level has 
therefore become increasingly entrenched.21 
The contribution of exports to the dispersion of 
trend growth has decreased steadily over the past 
few years (Graph 35). Since the late nineties, 
changes in external competitiveness have 
contributed to reducing growth disparities within 
the euro area, although this effect has been slow 
and is therefore captured in trend measures as 
much as in cyclical measures. In contrast to 
exports, trend developments in domestic demand 
                                                     
21  A similar conclusion was reached in a note by Espinoza, 
A. and J.M. Fournier (2005) (“Les particularités de la 
reprise de 2003 en zone euro”, Diagnostics Prévisions et 
Analyses Economiques, Ministère de l’Economie des 
Finances et de l’Industrie). 
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were a source of increasing divergence, notably 
due to private consumption.  
Graph 35: Dispersion in growth potential (1) and share 
of external contribution (2)(3) 
(in % – 1981 to 2004) 
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(1) Variance around mean. 
(2) Covariance between growth potential and trend growth of 
exports and external contribution. 
(3) Euro area excluding IE and LU. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Differences in potential growth rates may be 
associated with a welcome increase in the per 
capita income levels of catching-up countries. 
This, however, has not the case since the start of 
EMU. Neither potential growth nor even total 
factor productivity growth show any long-term 
correlation with relative income levels. 
Table 3: Factor contributions to potential output growth 
and variance (in %) 
 Potential output (1) Variance of potential output 
 Labour Capital TFP Total Labour Capital TFP Total 
1990-94 0.4 0.9 1.1 2.4 0.4 0.1 -0.11 0.5
1994-99 0.6 0.8 0.9 2.3 0.1 0.0 0.05 0.2
2000-04 0.8 0.8 0.7 2.2 0.2 0.0 0.19 0.5
(1) Unweighted average of 12 euro-area members.  
Source: Commission services. 
 
A production function approach shows that the 
capital inputs, labour inputs and total factor 
productivity (TFP) contributed approximately 
equal shares to euro-area growth in the last five 
years.22 There are, however, significant 
                                                     
22 However, caution should be exercised in interpreting the 
quantitative results of potential growth calculations. First, 
interdependencies among production inputs work in all 
directions. For instance, the functioning of the labour 
market influences the attractiveness of a country for 
investment, while the level of investment affects the 
differences across countries both in terms of 
potential growth and in the relative importance 
of the various input factors (Graph 36).  
Graph 36: Growth contributions by input factor  
(average 2000-2004 – in %) 
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Source: Commission services. 
 
Variations in labour inputs are the most 
important factor explaining differences in 
potential output (Table 3). In the last five years 
employment explained more than half of the 
total variance in potential output. In the early 
nineties this was as much four fifths, even 
though the contribution of labour to average 
growth at the time was substantially less. The 
long-term ability to increase labour’s contribution 
to growth depends on demographic 
developments on the one hand and the 
regulatory environment on the other. Already 
now, the influence of demographic 
developments (including immigration) on growth 
is clearly visible. It is no coincidence that the 
fastest-growing economy (Ireland) registered a 
significant population increase, while Germany 
and Italy show little dynamics in their population 
growth.23 Important regulatory factors 
determining employment growth are the 
                                                                              
demand for labour. Similarly, the skill level of workers 
impacts on TFP growth. Second, standard filtering and 
production function approaches cannot distinguish slow 
adjustment processes from lasting structural factors. 
23 Effects of ageing go beyond their simple contribution to 
the labour force. Those countries with an unfavourable 
demographic structure might therefore be stuck not just 
with lower absolute growth but also lower per-capita 
growth compared with countries with a younger 
population. 
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structure of the tax-benefit system, wage setting, 
working time flexibility, employment protection 
legislation, active labour market policies, early 
retirement and disability schemes, etc.  
Total factor productivity has developed into the 
second important factor to explain dispersion in 
potential output. TFP trends are the mirror 
image of the trends for labour inputs. The 
contribution of TFP to average growth was 
higher in the early nineties, but was negatively 
associated with the dispersion of growth between 
Member States (Table 3). Productivity shocks 
have since then become positively correlated 
with the dispersion of potential output growth. 
The ICT sector is likely to have played a major 
role in this development.  
Graph 37: Product market regulation (1) and TFP 
growth (2000-2004) 
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(1) Index calculated by OECD. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Structural and regulatory differences contribute 
substantially to long-run growth differences. 
Countries with a lower degree of product market 
regulation generally registered a higher TFP 
growth than more regulated countries 
(Graph 37). TFP is also influenced by a number 
of other factors such as the educational system, 
foreign direct investments, and demographics, 
geography, or specialisation.  
Differences in the growth of capital stock also 
increase the dispersion in potential output, albeit 
by a significantly lesser degree than labour inputs, 
or, recently TFP. In contrast to the important 
cyclical role of investment, the capital stock 
cannot be identified as a major factor for 
determining structural growth. This is probably 
related to difficulties in properly measuring the 
value of capital stock. First, it mixes different 
types of capital with different productive 
potential. Second, important investments such as 
education and research are not captured at all. 
The competitiveness adjustment mechanism 
In the absence of national monetary policy and 
changes in nominal exchange rates, a large part 
of the adjustment burden to growth imbalances 
falls on price and competitiveness developments: 
a Member State experiencing a stronger upswing 
than the rest of the euro area is likely to face 
comparatively faster inflation and a progressive 
appreciation of its real exchange rate, which 
should rebalance demand.  
The competitiveness adjustment mechanism has 
clearly been at play in the euro area in the past 
few years. Among the five countries which 
posted large positive output gaps in 2000, four 
experienced a sharper slowdown in export 
growth than the euro-area average in the early 
2000s (Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands 
and Finland) with only Portugal performing 
better than the average. Conversely, Germany, 
which was in a weaker cyclical position in 2000, 
has enjoyed a comparatively stronger export 
performance in the past few years. These 
developments can be related to changes in the 
real effective exchange rate in all countries except 
Ireland and Finland.24 
However, the competitiveness adjustment 
mechanism is working only very slowly. A 
striking feature of real exchange rate 
developments since the beginning of Stage 3 of 
EMU is the existence of large and persistent 
cross-country differences in underlying 
competitiveness trends. This is the case even for 
                                                     
24  Ireland has faced a significant appreciation of the REER 
based on unit labour costs but not of the one based on 
export prices. Finland has experienced no appreciation in 
the former and a marked depreciation in the latter. 
However, there is some evidence that for Ireland the 
REER based on unit labour costs may underestimate the 
extent of the losses in competitiveness incurred in the 
past few years (Quarterly Report on the Euro Area Vol. 4 
No.1 2005). 
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intra-area developments, which abstract from 
different exposure to external shocks 
(Graph 38).25 
Graph 38: Developments in intra-area competitiveness 
(REER based on unit labour costs (1) – index 1999=100) 
(Jan-1999 to April 2005) 
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(1) REER against 11 other Member States. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
There is some evidence that the euro area is still 
paying the price for two sets of shocks incurred 
in the run-up to EMU (i.e. an inappropriate level 
of some of the locked-in exchange rate parities 
and demand shocks linked to interest rate 
convergence) and that the adjustment to these 
two shocks has been slow. The clearest case for 
this is that of Germany, which has been going 
through a competitiveness-improving process 
that does not seem to be over yet and still needs 
to spark a revival in domestic demand. 
Inappropriate wage dynamics in some Member 
States are the most important reason for the lack 
of effectiveness of the competitiveness channel 
as a correction mechanism to cyclical imbalances. 
For instance, Italy has experienced a marked 
appreciation of its real exchange rate over the 
past few years, because unit labour costs have 
surged on the back of a substantial slowdown in 
productivity. In a similar vein, the significant 
deterioration of competitiveness registered in 
                                                     
25  It is nevertheless worth bearing in mind that differences 
in competitiveness performance are sometimes difficult 
to interpret due to the fact that different real exchange 
rate measures may paint quite different pictures. Such 
differences may be the consequence of exporters’ margin 
behaviours or may signal important differences in the 
sectoral composition of the tradable and non-tradable 
sectors.  
Spain since the launch of EMU cannot be fully 
ascribed to cyclical developments but also seems 
to be partly explained by a lack of competition in 
some sectors and the effect of wage indexation 
schemes. In this respect, it is worth noting that 
the correlation between the output gap and 
competitiveness developments was rather weak 
in 2004. 
Graph 39: Output gaps (1), euro area 
(in % of trend GDP– 2000 and 2004) 
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Source: Commission services. 
 
The cost of such rigidities can be high. Notably, 
rigid prices and wages may cause the 
competitiveness adjustment mechanism to 
temporarily amplify cyclical disparities. As 
nominal interest rates are determined at the euro-
area level, higher inflation will entail lower real 
interest rates in the faster-growing country. If 
economic agents respond to lower real interest 
rates by investing and consuming more, the 
economy will initially face further demand and 
cyclical pressures. Only when the 
competitiveness mechanism gains traction will 
the cyclical asymmetry be progressively eroded. 
However, persistence in inflation differences due 
to price inertia may in turn lead to excessive 
losses in competitiveness and a period of 
overshooting in the real exchange rate. Overall, 
the competitiveness adjustment mechanism is 
likely to give rise to adjustment cycles. 26  
                                                     
26  For a detailed analysis of the interplay between real 
interest rates and real exchange rates and the dynamics of 
overheating and overcooling see Deroose, S., Langedijk, 
S. and W. Roeger (2004), “Reviewing adjustment 
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Adjustment to past overheating has led to 
overcooling in some Member States. Two of the 
Member States which experienced large positive 
output gaps in the late nineties (Portugal and the 
Netherlands) now post the largest negative 
output gaps in the euro area (Graph 39). In 
addition to the competitiveness channel, 
however, there are other factors at work such as 
the correction of domestic financial and fiscal 
imbalances in Portugal27 and negative housing 
wealth effects in the Netherlands.28 
An excessively slow competitiveness adjustment 
also carries the risk of negative spillovers on 
potential growth, when a cyclical weakness 
persists over too long a period. First, persistently 
high real interest rates could weigh on 
investment and the capital stock. Second, a 
further deterioration of cyclical conditions could 
weigh on labour demand and entail an increase in 
structural unemployment due to hysteresis 
effects. 
The functioning of the competitiveness 
adjustment mechanism within EMU is subject to 
a number of asymmetries. First, the adjustment 
mechanism works more rapidly in countries 
which are more open to trade. For the euro area, 
this basically means that it is likely to be more 
effective in smaller Member States than in larger 
ones.29 Second, as already noted, housing wealth 
effects may differ significantly between Member 
States, paving the way for possibly large 
differences in the risk of over-adjustment. Third, 
the functioning of the labour market and the 
degree of competition in the product market 
determine how fast deviations in output gaps 
affect prices. Finally, the link between changes in 
                                                                              
dynamics in EMU: from overheating to overcooling”, 
Economic Papers No. 198. European Commission. 
27  See European Commission (2004), “The Portuguese 
economy after the boom”, Directorate General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs, Occasional Papers 
No. 8. 
28  See Albers, R. and S. Langedijk (2004), “The Netherlands: 
from riches to rags”, ECFIN Country Focus, Vol. 1 
Issue 13. 
29  See Hoeller, P., Giorno, C., and C. de la Maisonneuve 
(2002), “Overheating in euro area economies: should 
fiscal policy react?”, Economic Department Working 
Paper No. 323, OECD. 
price competitiveness and export growth 
depends on the sensitivity of world demand to 
the prices of domestic products.  
The working of the competitiveness adjustment 
mechanism may also be complicated by the 
existence of strong sectoral and geographical 
specialisation effects. Specialisation effects may 
have a significant impact on export growth which 
can either reinforce or counteract price 
competitiveness effects. For instance, Ireland and 
Finland have seen their specialisation becoming 
less growth-supportive in the early part of this 
decade, a factor which has helped the progressive 
cooling-off of their economies. Unfavourable 
specialisation effects have contributed to the 
overcooling of the Dutch economy in the past 
few years and have also aggravated Italy’s 
competitiveness problems. 
3. Policy implications 
Getting to grips with growth differences in the 
euro area is a matter of priority for economic 
policies. If an individual Member State fails to 
absorb a shock rapidly, this may result in a 
protracted period of low growth, which could 
trigger a damaging spiral of falling potential 
growth due to weak investment, eroding skills 
and rising levels of economic inactivity amongst 
the working age population. An extended period 
of below potential growth will also weigh heavily 
on consumer and investor expectations and may 
in addition create severe budgetary difficulties. 
On the macroeconomic side, fiscal policy has 
assumed a more important role under EMU 
given the absence of national monetary policy 
and exchange rates in the face of disturbances 
with differentiated impacts. Automatic budgetary 
stabilisers can play a central part in cushioning 
the initial impact of such disturbances, although 
their effectiveness will depend on the type of 
shock in question. Ensuring the implementing of 
the Stability and Growth Pact will better allow 
the full functioning of the automatic budgetary 
stabilisers. An issue for further discussion 
concerns whether, and under which 
circumstances, additional budgetary adjustment 
may be required under EMU, particularly in the 
context of overheating. 
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Ensuring a more even transmission of monetary 
policy could help to reduce an important source 
of growth differences in the euro area. Research 
suggests that an opening up of financial markets, 
for example in the retail banking sector, would 
increase the effectiveness of monetary policy by 
ensuring a more symmetric transmission of 
interest rate changes in the Member States. An 
issue for further research concerns the link 
between liberalisation in euro-area housing 
markets and the potential for asset price swings 
and increased volatility in household wealth. 
Further consideration could also be given to the 
challenge of ensuring the downward adjustment 
of prices in a low inflationary environment. In 
such circumstances, the adjustment may need to 
take longer in order to achieve the required 
magnitude. 
On the microeconomic side, further economic 
integration should help to reduce growth 
differences. As the elimination of national 
exchange rates encourages closer trade ties within 
the euro area and the degree of economic 
openness becomes more similar amongst 
Member States, national business cycles are 
expected to become more closely aligned. A 
further effective integration of financial markets, 
for example, could help to reduce the volatility of 
consumption within the euro area by increasing 
opportunities for risk sharing and consumption 
smoothing in the face of changing economic 
conditions. 
Structural reforms are also necessary to 
strengthen the operation of the competitiveness 
adjustment channel. The latter holds the key to 
adjusting to economic disturbances, to tackling 
persistent growth differences, and therewith to 
the smooth functioning of EMU. In this context, 
particular attention has to be paid to reforms that 
enhance the responsiveness of real wages to 
economic developments and foster a sufficient 
degree of competition in product markets.  
In conclusion, EMU entails a fundamental shift 
in the economic policy framework, with the 
burden of adjustment to disturbances with 
differentiated impacts being clearly located at the 
national level. The persistence of growth 
differences in the euro area suggests that 
adjustment mechanisms are not responding to 
such disturbances in a timely manner and that 
some Member States are paying a high self-
imposed price in terms of protracted periods of 
overheating and overcooling. To rectify this 
situation, it is critical that Member States move 
forward through an appropriate combination of 
macroeconomic policies, increased economic 
integration and structural reforms in labour, 
product and capital markets.  
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Focus 
III. Housing markets and the business cycle in the euro area 
Real house prices in the euro area have experienced a remarkable phase of growth since the late 1990s. However, unlike in 
the USA or the UK, there is little empirical evidence that house prices have been a major source of economic resilience in the 
latest downturn in the euro area as a whole. Developments in housing markets can affect the business cycle via several 
channels, including the transmission of monetary policy, wealth effects and the role of house prices as collateral for bank 
lending. Available empirical evidence suggests that these channels are weak in the euro area as a whole and in some of its 
largest Member States while being more potent in a number of smaller Member States. These asymmetries reflect structural 
differences in housing and mortgage markets that would warrant further research. Further integration and liberalisation of 
mortgage and housing markets within the euro area would increase the efficiency of these markets and help reduce asymmetries 
between Member States in the transmission of shocks, including monetary policy shocks. However, the role of housing markets 
as a source of resilience during cyclical downturns should be considered with caution. Although house prices have increased in 
the latest downturn, they have generally tended to move in tandem with the business cycle over the past three decades, thus 
possibly contributing to boom-bust cycles. 
The link between housing and mortgage markets 
on the one hand, and economic growth on the 
other, has recently attracted much attention from 
researchers and policy makers. There are two 
major reasons for this interest. First, EMU has 
stimulated the analysis of potential asymmetries 
in the transmission of the single monetary policy 
between euro-area countries. This literature has 
identified housing and mortgage markets as a 
potential cause of differences in monetary 
transmission. Second, since the late 1990s there 
has been a concomitant sharp rise in real house 
prices and mortgage debt in a number of 
industrialised countries. In a subset of these 
countries, consumption appears to have been 
more resilient in the latest downturn (e.g. the 
USA and the UK), a fact that has been related by 
some to a stronger housing wealth effect on 
consumption. Against this background, this 
Focus section reviews the theoretical 
interrelations between housing and mortgage 
markets and the wider economy, the main 
stylised facts on the housing market and business 
cycles and the main results of the empirical 
literature. It then draws some policy implications 
and concludes.  
1. Housing markets and domestic 
demand: the channels of transmission 
A key part of the interconnection between 
housing markets and the business cycle relates to 
the housing transmission channel of monetary 
policy. It is important to stress, however, that the 
links between housing markets and the business 
cycle go beyond the transmission of monetary 
policy as house prices do not only respond to 
change in monetary policy but are also affected 
by other factors.  
Monetary policy channel 
Graph 40 summarises the main channels of 
transmission of monetary policy through the 
housing and mortgage markets.30 Changes in 
interest rates affect domestic demand via three 
main private consumption channels (income, 
wealth and collateral effects), and via two 
residential construction channels (cost of capital 
and Tobin Q). 
Income effects. Household consumption can 
increase as a result of the direct income effect of 
lower interest payments on household debt (of 
which the largest share is typically related to 
housing purchase). The income effect will be 
stronger when household debt is large relative to 
disposable income, when variable and adjustable 
interest rate contracts are prevalent (including the 
possibility of restructuring the debt) and when 
the pass-through from base interest rates to retail 
mortgage rates is quicker and fuller. However, in 
most countries (especially in the euro area) the 
household sector as a whole has positive net 
holdings of interest-bearing assets. Therefore, the 
                                                     
30  Adapted from Giulodori, M. (2004), “Monetary policy 
shocks and the role of house prices across European 
countries”, DNB Working Paper No. 15, De 
Nederlandsche Bank. 
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income effect of a reduction in interest rates 
could even dampen private consumption.31  
Wealth effects. Households may increase their 
level of consumption in response to an increase 
in their housing wealth. The housing wealth 
effect will essentially depend on house price 
sensitivity to interest rates and on households’ 
propensity to consume out of housing wealth. 
House price volatility is generally higher in 
countries with a short average duration of 
mortgage debt and with lower transaction costs.  
An increase in housing wealth is different from 
an increase in financial wealth in two important 
respects. First, due to the dual role of housing as 
both a real asset and a commodity yielding 
service, an increase in the value of housing assets 
causes a redistribution of wealth within the 
household sector (see Box 1). Secondly, an 
increase in housing wealth has mostly short-term 
effects on non-housing consumption. In the long 
run, there should be only limited impact on non-
housing household expenditure from wealth 
effects, as a rise in real estate values cannot be 
related to a future increase in productive capacity 
(as, for instance, in the case of equities). 
Property as collateral. Higher house prices raise 
the value of the collateral available to 
households. With financial market imperfections, 
the extra collateral loosens credit constraints on 
                                                     
31  Such a negative effect has, for instance, already been 
registered in Italy. 
households and supports the expansion of debt-
financed expenditures.  
Residential construction. Residential construction 
will be stimulated directly by the fall in the cost 
of capital. To the extent that monetary policy 
affects house prices, it will also have an impact 
on construction via the Tobin-Q effect.32  
Other possible channels 
House prices are determined by a host of factors, 
including demographic developments, income, 
interest rates, level of financial development, 
government housing policies, etc. It is therefore 
clear that, independently of any monetary policy 
action, both cyclical developments (e.g. changes 
in market interest rates or household income) 
and structural changes (e.g. financial market 
liberalisation and innovation, public subsidies to 
house purchase) could give rise to a credit and 
housing price cycle. Expected returns on 
alternative assets also influence the demand for 
houses.33 
The characteristics and structure of mortgage 
markets play an important role in shaping the 
link between housing markets and growth, and in 
particular the wealth effect. First, easy access to 
                                                     
32  When the ratio of house prices to construction costs 
increases, it becomes more profitable to build new 
houses. 
33  For instance the fall in stock prices in 2000-2003 is 
thought to have increased the attractiveness of housing 
assets. 
Official interest rates  Mortgage interest rates Cost of capital 
Disposable Income 
Tobin Q Collateral  Wealth  
Residential 
investment 
Private consumption 
Graph 40: The housing channel of monetary policy transmission 
House prices 
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mortgage financing strengthens the sensitivity of 
house prices to changes in the underlying 
fundamentals. Second, housing wealth is more 
“liquid” when mortgage markets are more 
complete (i.e. when they offer a wider range of 
contracts and, in particular, the possibility of 
withdrawing housing equity) and transaction 
costs (including taxes) are lower. This greater 
liquidity would normally result in a higher 
marginal propensity to consume out of housing 
wealth. Third, the option of refinancing 
mortgages when interest rates fall may support 
disposable income in downturns (refinancing is 
most common in the USA).  
2. Some stylised fact of the euro-area 
housing market and business cycles  
Some features of the aggregate euro-area 
housing market cycle  
International synchronisation of house prices. As 
housing assets are tradable mostly on a local 
basis, local supply and demand conditions play a 
prominent role in shaping prices. 
Notwithstanding this strong geographical 
segmentation, house price cycles have shown 
some international synchronisation over the past 
three decades (Graph 41). For instance, the 
correlation of de-trended house prices between 
the euro area and the USA has exceeded 50% for 
the past 30 years. However, the degree of 
international synchronisation tends to vary over 
time. The euro-area cycle lagged its US or UK 
counterparts in the late 1980s and early 1990s but 
prices have moved in tandem in the three 
countries/regions since the mid-1990s.  
Graph 41: Real house price indices  
(base 2000= 100 – 1974 to 2004)  
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Source: European Commission calculations based on data from the 
ECB, the OECD and national sources. 
Box 1: Distributional impact of changes in house prices 
 
Like other assets, house prices can be thought of as being the discounted value of the future benefits of home
ownership. As a first approximation, the discounted value is equivalent to the expected rental value (the imputed rent
for owner-occupiers) over the expected life of the house. In contrast to other assets, however, houses also provide
services to households. In consequence, a rise in real house prices not only impacts on the wealth of the owners but
also has potentially important distributional effects within an economy. These effects are partly determined by the
source of the rise in prices (e.g. whether it is caused by lower interest rates or higher expected rents).  
 
Schematically, the first-round impact of higher house prices on the three main categories of households (owner-
occupiers, tenants and landlords) would be as follows: 
 
• If higher house prices are caused by higher expected rents, owner-occupiers experience a positive wealth effect
but also an increase in the current and future price of housing services (a negative income effect). Generally, the
former is assumed to dominate. If house prices rise in response to a fall in interest rates (and hence in the
discount factor), there will be a wealth gain for owner-occupiers but no negative income effect. 
 
• Tenants experience a welfare loss when higher house prices are caused by higher current and/or expected rents.
In the same vein, prospective would-be buyers will need to save more to be able to buy a house. When house
prices respond to lower interest rates there should be no impact on the welfare of tenants. For prospective new
buyers the higher purchase cost will be partly offset by the lower costs of servicing the debt (and they will have
to provide a higher initial down-payment if mortgage loans are limited to below 100% of the purchase value).  
 
• Whatever the cause of higher house prices, landlords (and other type of investors owning rented houses)
experience a wealth gain. 
 
Therefore, a rise in house prices causes a transfer of wealth from current tenants and future home owners to existing
home owners. For a ‘pure’ wealth effect to appear, the propensity to consume of home owners must exceed that of
other household groups. These distributional aspects suggest a stronger impact of house price changes on aggregate
consumption when home ownership is higher and when the changes in house prices are caused by interest rate
movements rather than by a change in expected rents.  
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The partial (and unstable) international 
synchronisation of house price cycles may be 
explained by the fact that house prices are partly 
driven by macroeconomic variables such as 
interest rates and disposable income that can 
move in tandem across countries during some 
periods (for instance, when countries are subject 
to common shocks). Nevertheless, national 
housing markets retain their own individual 
dynamics. According to some estimates, only two 
fifths of the fluctuations in house prices can, on 
average, be accounted for by macroeconomic 
determinants.34 
Graph 42: Real house price cycles  
(deviation from a log-linear trend in %  – 1974 to 2004)  
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Source: European Commission calculations based on data from the 
ECB, the OECD and national sources. 
The euro area, the USA and the UK have all 
experienced a rapid increase in real house prices 
since the late 1990s. The rise in prices started 
somewhat earlier in the USA and the UK (in 
1997) than in the euro area (in 1999), where it 
has also been less sharp. Since 1996, real 
residential prices have increased by 30% in the 
euro area, 50% in the USA and 115% in the UK. 
De-trended house prices have now reached 
historical highs in the 3 countries/regions 
(Graph 42). The common surge in residential 
prices can be ascribed to several factors, 
including low inflation and interest rates. 
However, it cannot be excluded that housing 
markets have recently displayed some bubble-like 
features in several advanced economies with a 
                                                     
34  Based on VAR models for 18 advanced economies. See 
Zhu, H. (2005), “The importance of property markets for 
monetary policy and financial stability”, in BIS Papers 
No. 21, ‘Real estate indicators and financial stability’. 
rising share of buyers basing their investment 
decisions on the expectation of rapid capital 
gains.35 
Graph 43: Real house prices and the business cycle, 
euro area (1) (deviations from trend in % – 1974 to 2004)  
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(1) Log-linear trend for house prices and HP filter trend for 
consumption and the output gap.  
Source: European Commission calculations based on data from 
Eurostat, the ECB, the OECD and national sources. 
House prices and the business cycle. There is a clear 
link between house prices and the business cycle. 
The correlation between the house price cycle 
and the output gap has exceeded 50% over the 
past three decades in the euro area (Graph 43). It 
is even higher (above 60%) if the deviation of 
private consumption relative to its trend is used 
instead of the output gap. The link between 
house prices and the business cycle appears, 
however, to be unstable. The correlation was 
very strong from the 1970s to the 1990s but a 
clear decoupling has been observed since 2000 
when house prices continued to surge while 
activity and consumption entered a phase of 
cyclical weakness.  
House prices and residential construction. There is also 
a link between house prices and the residential 
construction cycle (Graph 44). The correlation is 
broadly similar to that observed for the output 
gap for the 1970s and 1980s although there is no 
noticeable lag between the two cycles. Since the 
1990s, however, construction supply has 
responded in a much more muted way and with 
significant lags to changes in house prices. In the 
                                                     
35  According to IMF estimations, determinants of house 
prices cannot explain fully the rise in house prices 
observed in some countries in recent years. See IMF 
“World Economic Outlook” September 2004.  
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early 1990s the change in behaviour may have 
been explained, at least partly, by German 
unification but it is worth noting that it has 
persisted through the latest run-up in prices.  
Graph 44: Real house prices and the residential 
construction cycle (1)  
(deviations from trend in % – 1976 to 2004)  
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(1) Log-linear trend for house prices and HP filter trend for 
residential construction.  
Source: European Commission calculations based on data from 
Eurostat, the ECB, the OECD and national sources. 
Overall, the ongoing expansion phase of the 
house price cycle appears remarkable on several 
counts in the euro area as well as in the USA and 
the UK. It is longer and stronger than its 
predecessors of the 1970s and the 1980s. It has 
shown some counter-cyclical features rather than 
the usual pro-cyclical pattern observed in the 
past. Finally, it is worth noting that, in the euro 
area, the rise in house prices seems to have had a 
more limited impact on construction activity than 
in the past. 
The picture within the euro area  
The average euro-area picture conceals large 
differences at Member State level. Given the 
existence of large structural differences in 
housing and mortgage markets (see Box 2), these 
differences are not very surprising. 
Synchronisation across Member States. The 
synchronisation of house prices across Member 
States remains generally relatively limited. French 
and, to a lesser extent, Italian and Spanish 
housing prices show strong co-movements with 
the euro-area aggregate but synchronisation is 
much lower in the case of countries such as 
Germany, Austria, Belgium, Finland and Ireland 
(Table 4). Furthermore, synchronisation with the 
euro-area average tends to be unstable and 
decreased in the 1990s in nearly all Member 
States except France and Spain. The volatility of 
the house price cycles also tends to vary 
substantially depending on the countries 
considered. Overall, these results indicate that 
national markets remain fairly segmented within 
the euro area.36 It is therefore difficult to talk 
about a specific euro-area housing market. 
Table 4: Member States’ house price cycles 
(in %) 
 Correlation with the euro-area house price cycle Volatility (1) 
 1976-03 1991-03 1976-03 
BE 82 19 16 
DE 40 -31 5 
ES 58 92 18 
FR 90 99 9 
IE 54 32 24 
IT 69 63 14 
NL 65 25 27 
AT n.a. 9 n.a. 
PT n.a. 59 n.a. 
FI -29 42 19 
Euro area 100 100 7 
(1) As measured by the standard deviation of real house prices. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Graph 45: Real house prices (1) 
(annual average changes in % – 1999 to 2004)  
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(1) 1999-2003.  
(2) 1999-2002. 
Source: ECB, OECD and national sources. 
                                                     
36  However, geographical proximity may play a role in 
explaining price synchronisation between Member States 
as price correlation is high for some countries sharing a 
common border (e.g. Germany and Austria, Belgium and 
the Netherlands, Spain and France). Cross-country 
contagion effects can therefore not be totally ruled out. 
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After a period of convergence in the 1990s, 
house price cycles within the euro area have 
diverged again since 1997. Differences between 
Member States’ average changes in real house 
prices have been rather large over the past few 
years (Graph 45). Whereas prices have surged in 
countries such as Ireland, Spain and France, they 
have contracted or remained stable in Austria, 
Germany and Portugal. Hence developments in 
house prices have tended to be counter-cyclical 
only in a subset of countries. 
Box 2: Main characteristics of euro-area mortgage markets  
 
Most euro-area mortgage markets have been expanding rapidly in recent years (see table below) and in many 
Member States outstanding mortgage debt is currently at historically high levels (relative to GDP or household 
disposable income). The growth of mortgage lending has been fostered by both macroeconomic factors (such as the 
fall in interest rates and the strong growth of house prices in some countries) and structural developments (such as 
the increasing liberalisation and integration of financial markets). In spite of sharing some common trends, however, 
EU mortgage markets remain very diverse:  
• The size of the household sector’s residential mortgage debt varies considerably across countries, with ratios of 
mortgage debt to GDP above 60 per cent in Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom and below 25 
per cent in France, Italy and Greece.  
 
Key features of EU mortgage markets 
 Outstanding mortgage debt (% of GDP) Home ownership (%) 
 1995 2003 
Fixed or variable 
interest rate 
Loan term 
(years) 
Loan to 
value (%) 
1990 2002 
BE 21 28 F 20 83 67 71 
DE 45 54 F 25-30 67 39 42 
EL 4 14 V 15 75 76 83 
ES 17 32 V 15 70 78 85 
FR 20 23 F 15 67 54 55 
IE 24 37 V 20 66 79 77 
IT 8 11 Mixed 15 55 68 80 
LU 25 18 n/a 20-25 n/a n/a n/a 
NL 48 79 F 30 90 45 53 
AT 5 4 F 20-30 60 55 56 
PT 18 49 V 15 83 67 64 
FI 32 32 V 15-18 75 67 58 
Source: European mortgage federation, ECB (2003), Debelle (2004). 
• Owner-occupancy rates are around or above 80 per cent in Ireland, Spain, Greece and Italy and around 50 per 
cent or lower in Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands. Somewhat surprisingly, home-ownership levels 
appear to be negatively correlated with levels of household mortgage debt. This suggests that mechanisms other 
than borrowing – such as inter-generational transfers - provide access to home-ownership in low-debt countries. 
• The average typical loan-to-value (LTV) ratio (i.e. the typical amount of the mortgage loan relative to the value 
of the house) in the EU is around 70 per cent. LTV ratios are lowest in Austria and Italy (below 60 per cent) and 
highest in Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Portugal (80 per cent or more). 
• Typical loan terms tend to be shorter in Southern Europe. In France, Spain, Greece, Italy and Portugal, the 
typical loan term is 15 years, whereas a 25-30 year loan term is the norm in Austria, Germany, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Sweden. Both LTV ratios and mortgage terms are positively correlated 
with the amount of outstanding mortgage debt. 
• The typical duration of mortgage contracts is also different across countries. Detailed data are difficult to come 
by, but it is possible to roughly split the sample into a group of countries where variable rates are predominant 
and another where fixed rates are more common. These differences are often related to the prevailing funding 
sources for lenders (i.e. whether short-term deposits or long-term securities).   
These differences reflect Members States’ economic history and cultural factors, but also differences in policy 
approaches with respect to incentives for home-ownership, regulation of rental market, prudential regulation on 
mortgage credit,  legal protection of collateral, etc.  
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House prices and the business cycle. National 
differences are also substantial when looking at 
the link between the house price cycle and the 
business cycle. The correlation between house 
prices and the business or consumption cycles 
has traditionally been much stronger in some 
countries (e.g. Spain, the Netherlands and 
Finland) than in others (Belgium, Germany and 
Italy) (see Table 5). Most Member States have 
experienced a drop in this correlation since the 
1990s although the loosening of the link seems 
to have been more pronounced in Belgium and 
Germany. However, the link appears to have 
strengthened in Ireland and, to a lesser extent, in 
France.  
Table 5: Correlation between the house price cycle and 
the business cycle (1) (in %) 
 
Corr. with the 
private 
consumption cycle 
Corr. with the 
residential 
construction cycle  
 1976-03 1991-03 1976-03 1991-03 
BE 54 -40 60 -54 
DE 25 6 66 65 
ES 87 74 70 45 
FR 67 71 24 -23 
IE 66 87 57 67 
IT 31 23 62 96 
NL 83 76 46 31 
AT (2) n.a. 47 n.a. 19 
PT n.a. 80 n.a. n.a. 
FI 92 88 83 84 
Euro-12 69 56 51 -69 
(1) Log-linear trend for house prices and HP filter trend for 
consumption and residential construction. 
(2) 1991-02. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
House prices and residential construction. National 
differences also exist in the link between house 
prices and the residential construction cycle, but 
these seem to be narrower than for the 
consumption cycle. There is no apparent relation 
between the strength of the link between house 
prices and construction and the strength of the 
link between house prices and consumption. 
Some countries post a strong correlation for 
both consumption and residential construction 
(e.g. Spain and Finland), others only for one of 
the two variables (e.g. construction in Germany 
and Italy). As is the case for the consumption 
cycle, the link between house prices and 
residential construction appears to have 
weakened since the 1990s, although more so in 
some countries than others. 
4.  Main findings of the empirical 
literature  
Evidence from the monetary policy 
transmission literature  
Although empirical studies of the monetary 
transmission usually do not single out a ‘housing 
channel’, some indirect evidence can be derived 
from the estimated impact of monetary policy 
shocks on demand components and from the 
examination of specific links in the transmission 
mechanism.  
Table 6: Response of consumption to a monetary policy 
shock (1)  
 VAR models Large-scale structural models 
Year 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Euro-12 30 37 42 57 43 34 
USA 51 52 55 81 74 66 
(1) Share of consumption in the total response of private sector 
domestic demand to a monetary policy shock (in %).  
Source: Angeloni I., Kashyap, A.K., Mojon, B. and D. Terlizzese 
(2003), The Output Composition Puzzle: A Difference in the 
Monetary Transmission Mechanism in the Euro Area and the US”, 
ECB Working Paper No. 268. 
 
A stylised fact about the euro area is that the 
contribution of investment to the overall impact 
of a monetary policy shock on GDP is large 
relative to that of consumption, in spite of the 
much larger share of the latter in total domestic 
demand. In structural econometric models for 
the euro area, investment accounts for half to 
three quarters of the overall response of private 
sector domestic demand to the monetary policy 
shock, in spite of investment being only about a 
fifth of euro-area GDP (Table 6). This is in 
contrast to evidence for the US, where the 
consumption response plays a much greater role. 
Differences in the wealth effect are a possible 
explanation of this divergence, but by no means 
the only one. Larger welfare benefits in Europe 
may also be responsible for a more muted 
response of disposable income, and thus 
consumption, to monetary policy. Finally, more 
possibilities to refinance mortgage debt in the 
USA when interest rates fall, as well as a smaller 
share of interest-bearing assets in US household 
portfolios, could also be a factor.  
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Other pieces of evidence can be related to 
analyses of the various links and channels in the 
monetary transmission mechanism.  
First, analyses of the pass-through from 
monetary policy interest rates to mortgage 
interest rates conclude that the pass-through has 
become more potent and more similar across 
euro-area countries since 1999.37  
Second, there are some studies of the impact of 
monetary policy shocks on house prices. VAR 
models suggest a statistically significant but 
economically limited impact of monetary policy 
on real house prices.38 A second standard result 
from this class of models is that most of the 
variation in house prices is explained by the own 
dynamics of national housing markets. 
Explanatory variables such as income, real 
interest rates and other asset prices (equity) 
explain the rest. Alternative approaches, such as 
panel data models of real house prices, point to 
qualitatively similar results but to a more 
powerful reaction to interest rates.39 Moreover, 
studies usually find a significant role for the 
growth of credit aggregates although the 
direction of causality between credit and prices is 
not totally clear. For instance, Tsatsaronis and 
Zhu (2004) find evidence that the effect of house 
prices on credit supply is stronger in countries 
where rates are variable and where banks use 
more market-based property valuation methods 
for loan accounting.40 
Third, there is some evidence concerning the 
income channel. Earlier studies suggest a negative 
income effect following a cut in official interest 
rates. The direction of the effect depends on the 
response of long-term interest rates and the net 
asset position of the household sector. Assuming 
that long-term interest rates fall following 
monetary policy loosening, the negative impact 
                                                     
37  Angeloni, I. and M. Ehrmann (2003), “Monetary policy 
transmission in the euro area: any changes after EMU?”, 
ECB Working Paper No. 240. 
38  See, for instance Giuliodori (2004) and Zhu (2005).  
39  See for instance the IMF, “World Economic Outlook”, 
September 2004. 
40  Tsatsaronis, K. and H. Zhu (2004), “What drives house 
price dynamics: cross-country evidence”, BIS Quarterly 
Review, March.  
would typically be stronger in countries with high 
public debt, such as Italy or Belgium.41 More 
recent simulations for the euro area confirm the 
possibility of a negative and powerful income 
effect. 42 
Residential investment is rarely separated out 
from other investment components in empirical 
analyses. The available evidence suggests that the 
reaction of residential investment to a monetary 
policy shock in euro-area countries is weaker 
than that of non-residential investment. The 
opposite holds for the US. 43 
Evidence on the housing wealth effect 
Although the issue of the size of the housing 
wealth effect has attracted significant attention in 
some countries such as the USA and the UK, 
empirical research on the euro area is still 
relatively sparse and cross-country comparisons 
remain relatively difficult. Nevertheless, several 
recent studies have endeavoured to quantify 
housing wealth effects in a multi-country setting. 
Methodologically, this recent research can be 
grouped around two types of approach.  
Some studies rely on cross-sectional panel 
regressions to provide an average picture of the 
housing wealth effect in advanced economies. 
For instance, Case et al. (2001) estimate a simple 
consumption function on a panel of 14 OECD 
countries and find elasticities of consumption 
relative to housing wealth in the range of 0.11-
0.17. 44  Ludwig and Slok (2004) estimate a more 
sophisticated consumption function (with an 
error correction term) on a sample of 15 OECD 
countries and find a substantially smaller impact 
                                                     
41  Households own a large share of the stock of public debt 
in these countries.  
42  McAdam, P. and J. Morgan (2001), “The monetary 
transmission mechanism at the euro area level: issues and 
results using structural macroeconomic models” ECB 
Working Paper No 93.  
43  Smets, Frank (1995), “Central bank macroeconometric 
models and the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism”, in BIS (1995), “Financial Structures and the 
Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanism”, Basle. 
44 Case, K., Shiller, R. and J. Quigley (2001), “Comparing 
wealth effects: the stock market versus the housing 
market”, NBER Working Paper No. 8086. 
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of housing prices with a range of long-term 
elasticities of 0.01-0.04.  
A number of studies have tried to assess the 
importance of housing wealth effects by 
estimating similar consumption functions across 
several countries, thereby allowing more 
meaningful cross-country comparisons.45  
Three preliminary conclusions can be derived 
from these studies: 
Firstly, whereas housing wealth effects are 
generally identified in Anglo-Saxon countries, 
evidence for euro-area Member States is mixed. 
Positive housing wealth effects can be found in 
some smaller Member States such as the 
Netherlands, Finland, Ireland and possibly Spain. 
In contrast, it is likely that housing wealth has, at 
best, only a limited impact on consumption in 
the larger Member States, with France possibly 
being an exception. As a consequence, housing 
                                                     
45  See, for instance, Catte, P., Girouard, N., Price, R. and C. 
André (2004), “Housing markets, wealth and the business 
cycle”, OECD Economic Department Working Paper 
No. 394, June. 
wealth effects are generally difficult to identify at 
the euro-area aggregate level. 46  
Secondly, there is still substantial uncertainty as 
to the size of the housing wealth effect, as 
reflected by large ranges of elasticities in most 
countries. Cross-country comparisons should 
therefore be made with caution.  
Third, little research has so far been carried out 
on the factors that may explain large country 
differences in the strength of the housing wealth 
effect. A major exception is Catte et al. (2004) 
who underline the importance of housing equity 
withdrawal (HEW) and of households’ ability to 
extract cash from increases in house prices. 
Nevertheless, the conclusion of a strong link 
between HEW and private consumption is not 
                                                     
46  The conclusion is corroborated by two recent studies on, 
respectively, Germany and Italy which conclude on the 
absence of housing wealth effects in these two countries. 
See Hamburg, B., Hoffmann, M. and J. Keeler (2005), 
“Consumption, wealth and business cycles: why is 
Germany different?”, Deutsche Bundesbank, Discussion 
Paper No. 16/2005 and Grant, C. and T.A. Peltonen 
(2005), “Housing and equity wealth effects of Italian 
households”, DNB Working Paper No. 43, De 
Nederlandsche Bank. 
Box 3: Housing equity withdrawal (HEW) 
HEW occurs when the net flows of borrowing secured against housing exceeds investment in housing. In fact, two
definitions are found in the empirical literature: the narrow one excludes spending on home improvement (which
adds to residential investment in national accounts) while the broad one includes it.  
 
Homeowners can withdraw equity by: (i) selling a property and moving to a cheaper one but reducing the mortgage
by less than the difference in the value of the two properties; or, (ii) borrowing against their housing wealth. The
equity withdrawn can be used for consumption, for investment in non-housing assets, debt restructuring and for
housing improvement (in the case of the broad HEW definition). The amount of HEW is a function of a number of
factors, including the degree of home ownership, housing market turnover and access to mortgage equity withdrawal
products. Greater access to secured debt implies a fall in the inter-temporal discount rate (i.e. a fall in the relative
price of current versus future consumption). In particular, equity withdrawal may be used to finance durable goods
consumption, which would otherwise be financed by borrowing at higher interest rates.  
According to some estimates, HEW has contributed substantially to private consumption growth in some countries
(e.g. Australia, Ireland, the Netherlands, the UK and the United States) in the last cycle (Catte et al. (2004)).
However, this view is not undisputed. For instance, surveys carried out in the USA, the UK and the Netherlands
indicate that only a small proportion of the cash extracted from housing equity (in the broad sense) is directly spent
on consumption while most of it is used for either housing improvement (i.e. investment) or households balance
sheets, i.e. to replace higher-cost unsecured debt. Hence in the USA, housing equity cashed out may have accounted
for only 10-25% of the total increase in consumption in 2001.(*)  
This does not mean however that the overall potential impact of HEW is small but rather that there is no full
agreement as to the most important channels by which it affects the economy. Research by the Netherlands Central
Bank combining survey evidence and model simulations indicates that HEW contributed around 1 percentage point
to economic growth in the Netherlands in 1999 and 2000, while a halving of the level of equity withdrawal in 2001
contributed to a negative contribution to growth of around 0.5 pp in both 2001 and 2002.(**) 
 
(*) Deep A. and D. Domanski (2002), “Housing markets and economic growth: lessons from the US refinancing booms”, BIS Quarterly Review,
September. 
(**) Netherlands Central Bank (2003), ‘Financial behaviour of Dutch households’, Quarterly Bulletin, September 2003 
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undisputed (see Box 3). Furthermore, several 
other parameters may also be pivotal in 
explaining the strength of the link between house 
prices and consumption, including the 
completeness of mortgage markets, housing 
transaction costs, housing taxes and subsidies 
and the share of homes that are owner-occupied. 
In particular, there is some empirical evidence 
that the latter may be important.47 
5.  Conclusion and policy implications 
Since the late 1990s, euro-area house prices have 
experienced a rising trend that has been 
remarkable both for its duration and strength and 
because it has persisted during a phase of 
sustained cyclical downturn. However, contrary 
to countries like the USA or the UK, there is 
little empirical evidence that house prices have 
been a major source of economic resilience in the 
euro area as a whole. Empirical studies suggest 
that changes in house prices may have a 
significant incidence on domestic demand in a 
number of small euro-area Member States, but 
probably a limited impact in larger Member 
States such as Germany and Italy. 
There is a large consensus that one of the main 
determinants of the rise in house prices in many 
countries in the past few years has been the fall 
in interest rates in the latest downturn. This 
highlights the important role that the link 
between the housing market and the business 
cycle plays in determining the power of monetary 
policy.  
Differences in the link between the housing and 
the business cycle can be ascribed to differences 
in the structure of the housing and the mortgage 
markets. In general, the link is probably stronger 
where mortgage markets are more complete, 
home ownership is high and HEW is more 
widespread. However, further empirical research 
is clearly needed on the respective roles of these 
factors.  
In addition to bringing greater efficiency in the 
financial and housing sectors, further integration 
                                                     
47  See Chirinko, R.S., de Haan, L. and E. Sterken (2004), 
“Asset price shocks, real expenditures and financial 
structure: a multi-country analysis”, DNB Working Paper 
No. 14, De Nederlandsche Bank. 
and liberalisation of mortgage markets within the 
euro area would help reduce differences in the 
transmission of the monetary impulses and 
thereby facilitate the common monetary policy. 
Nevertheless, liberalisation also carries risks 
which need to be properly monitored and better 
understood. There is some evidence that house 
prices may affect credit supply. In that case, the 
possibility of mutually reinforcing effects 
between house prices and credit may lead to the 
formation of bubbles and imbalances in banks 
and household balance sheets. Historical 
experience suggests that boom and bust episodes 
are not uncommon in the housing market and 
that house-price busts tend to be followed by 
significant contractions in GDP.48  
Regarding the role of housing markets in 
boosting economic resilience to shocks, it is 
important to bear in mind two facets of the 
housing cycle. Firstly, developments in house 
prices have only tended to be counter-cyclical in 
the latest downturn. It can therefore not be 
excluded that they will again be more pro-cyclical 
in the future, thereby amplifying the business 
cycle rather than smoothing it. Secondly, the 
consumption-smoothing role of house prices in 
the latest downturn has been associated with a 
rise in mortgage debt that has increased 
households exposure to changes in interest rates 
and will, at some stage, act as break on growth as 
household balance sheets need to be 
consolidated.  
Finally, it is worth stressing that the impact of 
housing and mortgage market integration and 
liberalisation on growth differences between 
Member States is unclear. Reductions in 
differences in the transmission of monetary 
policy would clearly lead to a more synchronised 
response to changes in monetary policy. 
However, although partly synchronised across 
Member States, housing markets will remain 
largely local. As a result, more powerful links 
between the housing and the business cycles 
could, in some circumstances, lead to increased 
growth differences if house price developments 
turn out to be pro-cyclical. 
                                                     
48  See Bordo, M. D. and J. Olivier (2002), “Boom-busts in 
asset prices, economic instability and monetary policy”, 
Discussion Paper No. 3398, May.  
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V. Key indicators for the euro area 
 
1 Output 2001 2002 2003* Jan-05 Feb-05 Mar-05 Apr-05 May-05 Jun-05
 Industrial confidence 1.1 Balance -10 -12 -11 -5 -6 -8 -9 -11 -10 
 Industrial production 1.2 mom % ch 0.2 -0.9 0.2 0.5 -0.7 -0.1 0.6   
  2001 2002 2003* 04Q1 04Q2 04Q3 04Q4 05Q1 05Q2 
 Gross domestic product 1.3 Qtr. % ch    0.7 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.5  
2 Private consumption 2001 2002 2003* Jan-05 Feb-05 Mar-05 Apr-05 May-05 Jun-05
 Consumer confidence 2.1 Balance -6 -11 -18 -13 -13 -14 -13 -15 -15 
 Retail sales 2.2  mom % ch 1.2 1.1 0.1 0.9 -0.4 0.1 -1.1 1.1  
  2001 2002 2003* 04Q1 04Q2 04Q3 04Q4 05Q1 05Q2 
 Private consumption 2.3 Qtr. % ch 1.9 0.6 1.1 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.3  
3 Investment 2001 2002 2003* 04Q1 04Q2 04Q3 04Q4 05Q1 05Q2 
 Capacity utilization 3.1 % 83.5 81.2 80.7 81.1 81.1 82.0 82.1 81.9 80.9 
 Gross fixed capital formation 3.2 Qtr. % ch -0.3 -2.7 -0.4 -0.5 0.4 0.5 0.8 -0.7  
 Change in stocks 3.3 % of GDP -0.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0  
4 Labour market 2001 2002 2003* Jan-05 Feb-05 Mar-05 Apr-05 May-05 Jun-05
 Unemployment 4.1 % 8.0 8.2 8.4 8.8 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.8  
   2001 2002 2003* 04Q1 04Q2 04Q3 04Q4 05Q1 05Q2 
 Employment 4.2 Ann. % ch 1.4 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.8   
 Shortage of labour 4.3 % 7.8 3.8 2.5 2.4 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.3 2.4 
 Wages 4.4 Ann. % ch 2.8 2.9 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.0 1.8   
5 International transactions  2001 2002 2003* Jan-05 Feb-05 Mar-05 Apr-05 May-05 Jun-05
 Export order books 5.1 Balance -14 -22 -24 -10 -12 -15 -18 -19 -20 
 World trade 5.2 Bn. EUR 121 125 132 151 150 150 153   
 Exports of goods 5.3 Bn. EUR 767.4 776.9 1038.6 97.8 96.8 97.6 98.5   
 Imports of goods 5.4 Bn. EUR 802.2 781.6 970.4 94.3 91.8 93.6 94.8   
 Trade balance 5.5 Bn. EUR -34.8 -4.7 68.2 3.5 5.1 4.0 3.7   
   2001 2002 2003* 04Q1 04Q2 04Q3 04Q4 05Q1 05Q2 
 Exports of goods and services 5.6 Qtr. % ch 3.4 1.7 0.2 1.5 2.7 1.0 0.3 0.2  
 Imports of goods and services 5.7 Qtr. % ch 2.1 -1.6 2.1 0.3 2.7 2.4 0.9 -1.1  
   2001 2002 2003* Jan-05 Feb-05 Mar-05 Apr-05 May-05 Jun-05
 Current account balance 5.8 Bn. EUR 2.0 44.9 18.1 -1.8 6.0 2.7 -0.8   
 Direct investment (net) 5.9 Bn. EUR -104.6 -11.0 -18.4 -13.1 -4.9 -9.0 -6.4   
 Portfolio investment (net) 5.10 Bn. EUR 36.5 64.4 -9.4 -18.2 21.7 -4.5 -2.8   
6 Prices  2001 2002 2003* Jan-05 Feb-05 Mar-05 Apr-05 May-05 Jun-05
 HICP 6.1 Ann. % ch 2.3 2.3 2.1 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.9 2.1 
 Core HICP 6.2 Ann. % ch 1.9 2.5 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.6  
 Producer prices 6.3 Ann. % ch 2.2 1.7 1.6 3.9 4.2 4.2 4.3 3.5  
7 Monetary and financial indicators  2001 2002 2003* Jan-05 Feb-05 Mar-05 Apr-05 May-05 Jun-05
 Interest rate (3 months) 7.1 % p.a. 4.3 3.3 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 
 Bond yield (10 years) 7.2 % p.a. 5.0 4.8 4.1 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.5 3.3 3.2 
 ECB repo rate 7.3  % p.a. 3.25 2.75 2.25 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 
 Stock markets 7.4  Index 4047 3053 2420 2957 3050 3066 3014 3021 3152 
 M3 7.5 Ann. % ch 5.3 5.6 7.8 6.5 6.7 6.6 6.9   
 Credit to private sector (loans) 7.6 Ann. % ch 7.9 7.7 5.0 7.3 7.3 7.6 7.4 7.6  
 Exchange rate USD/EUR 7.7 Value 0.90 0.95 1.13 1.31 1.30 1.32 1.29 1.27 1.22 
 Nominal effective exchange rate 7.8 Index 91.5 95.1 106.4 112.5 111.6 112.5 111.6 110.5 107.6 
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Number Indicator Note Source 
1 Output   
1.1 Industrial confidence 
indicator  
Industry survey, average of balances to replies on production expectations, 
order books, and stocks (the latter with inverted sign) 
ECFIN 
1.2 Industrial production  Volume, excluding construction, wda Eurostat 
1.3 Gross domestic product  Volume (1995), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
2 Private consumption   
2.1 Consumer confidence 
indicator  
Consumer survey, average of balances to replies on four questions (financial 
and economic situation, unemployment, savings over next 12 months) 
ECFIN 
2.2 Retail sales Volume, excluding motor vehicles, wda Eurostat 
2.3 Private consumption Volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
3 Investment   
3.1 Capacity utilisation  In percent of full capacity, manufacturing, seasonally adjusted, survey data 
(collected in each January, April, July and October). 
ECFIN 
3.2 Gross fixed capital 
formation  
Volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
3.3 Change in stocks In percent of GDP, volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
4 Labour market   
4.1 Unemployment  In percent of total workforce, ILO definition, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
4.2 Employment  Number of employees, partially estimated, seasonally adjusted ECB/ 
Eurostat 
4.3 Shortage of labour Percent of firms in the manufacturing sector reporting a shortage of labour 
(unfilled job openings) as a constraint to production, seasonally adjusted  
ECFIN 
4.4 Wages  Not fully harmonised concept, but representative for each Member State 
(mostly hourly earnings) 
ECFIN 
5 International transactions  
5.1 Export order books Industry survey; balance of positive and negative replies, seasonally adjusted ECFIN 
5.2 Exports of goods Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area trade, fob Eurostat 
5.3 Imports of goods  Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area trade, cif Eurostat 
5.4 Trade balance Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area trade, fob-cif Eurostat 
5.5 Exports of goods and 
services  
Volume (1995 prices), including intra euro-area trade, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
5.6 Imports of goods and 
services  
Volume (1995 prices), including intra euro-area trade, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
5.7 Current account balance  Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area transactions; before 1997 partly 
estimated 
ECB 
5.8 Direct investment   (net) Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area transactions ECB 
5.9 Portfolio investment  (net) Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area transactions ECB 
6 Prices   
6.1 HICP  Harmonised index of consumer prices Eurostat 
6.2 Core HICP Harmonised index of consumer prices, excluding energy and unprocessed 
food 
Eurostat 
6.3 Producer prices Without construction Eurostat 
7 Monetary and financial indicators  
7.1 Interest rate  Percent p.a., 3-month interbank money market rate, period averages Datastream 
7.2 ECB repo rate Percent p.a., minimum bid rate of the ECB, end of period Datastream 
7.3 Bond yield Percent p.a., 10-year government bond yields, lowest level prevailing in the 
euro area, period averages 
Datastream 
7.4 Stock markets  DJ Euro STOXX50 index, period averages Datastream 
7.5 M3  Seasonally adjusted moving average moving average (3 last months)  ECB 
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7.6 Credit to private sector 
(loans) 
MFI loans to euro-area residents excluding MFIs and general government, 
monthly values: month end values, annual values: annual averages 
ECB 
7.7 Exchange rate USD/EUR  Period averages ECB 
7.8 Nominal effective exchange 
rate 
Against 13 other industrialised countries, double export weighted, 1995 = 
100, increase (decrease): appreciation (depreciation) 
ECFIN 
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